State v. Wright, 410 P.3d 893

Background

Kristofer J. Wright appealed convictions for first‑degree premeditated murder and conspiracy, arguing his right to be present at a continuance hearing was violated and caused a speedy‑trial violation.
This court previously found Wright’s right to be present was violated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his absence caused reversible harm.
On remand, Chief Judge Fleetwood held an on‑the‑record hearing; witnesses (including judges and prosecutors) described five possible outcomes had Wright been present when counsel sought the August 19 continuance.
Fleetwood found the most likely outcome was a short continuance charged to the State (so trial still would have occurred within 90 days), making Wright’s absence non‑prejudicial.
Wright also claimed (1) ineffective/conflicted counsel because his lawyer declined to argue Wright’s pro se speedy‑trial dismissal motion, (2) prosecutorial error for failing to bring him to trial within 90 days, (3) error in the premeditation jury instruction content and a prosecutor’s misstatement at the instruction conference, and (4) an improper intent instruction.
The court concluded any error from Wright’s absence, counsel’s failure to argue the pro se motion, or the State’s alleged speedy‑trial lapse was harmless; it also rejected the jury‑instruction challenges.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Wright)	Held
Right to be present at continuance hearing	Absence was harmless because, even if present, a short continuance charged to the State would have been granted and trial would occur within 90 days	Presence would have prevented attribution of the continuance to defense and preserved speedy‑trial rights; absence was reversible error	Harmless error: remand hearing found the likely outcome was a short continuance charged to State; no reversible harm
Counsel conflict re: arguing Wright’s pro se speedy‑trial dismissal	Any failure to argue dismissal caused no reversible harm because Wright still would have been tried within 90 days under likely scenario	Counsel should have argued pro se dismissal; failure constituted conflict and prejudiced Wright	No reversible prejudice; any error was harmless given remand factual finding that trial would have occurred within statutory time
Prosecutorial failure to try within 90 days	State argued statutory time would have been met under the remand scenario; no reversible prosecutorial error	State’s failure to bring Wright to trial within 90 days was prosecutorial error requiring reversal	Harmless / not reversible given remand findings; Brownlee limits relief under K.S.A. 22‑3402 so appellate remedy limited
Premeditation & intent jury instructions and prosecutor’s remark	Inclusion of premeditation factors reflects Kansas case law; prosecutor’s comment about “better practice” was incorrect but not outcome‑determinative; intent instruction allows circumstantial proof	Factor list in instruction and intent wording rendered instruction improper and unconstitutional	Instruction on premeditation proper (Bernhardt controls); prosecutor’s misstatement not sole cause of judge’s ruling; intent instruction upheld (Thach supports circumstantial proof of intent)

Key Cases Cited

State v. Wright, 305 Kan. 1176 (Kan. 2017) (prior decision finding right to be present violated and remanding for evidentiary hearing)
State v. Brownlee, 302 Kan. 491 (Kan. 2015) (limitations on appellate relief under K.S.A. 22‑3402 speedy‑trial statute)
State v. Bernhardt, 304 Kan. 460 (Kan. 2016) (approving inclusion of premeditation factor language in jury instruction)
State v. Thach, 305 Kan. 72 (Kan. 2016) (statute permits circumstantial evidence to prove intent)
State v. Reed, 306 Kan. 899 (Kan. 2017) (preservation exceptions for appellate review)
State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 (Kan. 2011) (harmless‑error burden analysis tied to Chapman)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (burden on beneficiary of constitutional error to show harmlessness)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (speedy‑trial prejudice factors)