State v. Wood, 296 Neb. 738

Defendant Robyn J. Wood was convicted by a jury of first-degree sexual assault of a protected individual under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.04(3) for sexual intercourse with T.Z., a 17-year-old resident at Boys Town while Wood was a shift manager.
Parties agreed Wood’s status and that sexual penetration occurred; the dispute centered on whether Wood “subjected” T.Z. to penetration under the statute.
Evidence included: staff testimony about Wood’s unusual, boundary-crossing relationship with T.Z.; roommate Heather Hutchinson’s statement that Wood admitted having sex with T.Z.; T.Z.’s testimony describing a mutual-seeming sexual encounter; and Wood’s recorded interview in which she described initially resisting, then ceasing resistance and participating, and disclosed attendance at Sexaholics Anonymous.
Jury instructions defined “subject” as “to bring under control or dominion”; neither party objected to those instructions at trial.
Wood moved for a new trial arguing insufficient evidence that she “subjected” T.Z.; the district court denied the motion and sentenced Wood to probation. Wood also argued on appeal the trial court erred by overruling her motion in limine to exclude evidence of Sexaholics Anonymous attendance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence that Wood “subjected” T.Z. to sexual penetration under § 28-322.04	State: evidence (T.Z., Hutchinson, Wood’s interview) shows Wood caused T.Z. to undergo penetration by participating	Wood: T.Z. was the aggressor who effectuated penetration; Wood did not exercise control or dominion, so she did not “subject” him	Court: “subject” means “to cause to undergo the action of something specified”; evidence supports conviction when viewed in prosecution’s favor
Proper statutory meaning of “subject” in § 28-322.04	State: follows Loyuk interpretation that “subject” means cause to undergo	Wood: argues “subject” requires control or dominion and thus conviction improper when victim effectuates penetration	Court: adopts Loyuk definition—“to cause to undergo”—so participation that causes sexual penetration suffices
Jury instruction defining “subject” as “bring under control or dominion”	State: instruction was given; no objection	Wood: instruction was erroneous and narrower than correct definition	Court: instructional error harmless because jury still convicted under the narrower definition and record supports guilt
Admissibility of evidence that Wood attended Sexaholics Anonymous	State: offered at trial; no contemporaneous objection	Wood: motion in limine sought exclusion; appellate challenge now	Court: issue not preserved—no trial objection—so appellate review waived

State v. Loyuk, 289 Neb. 967 (interpreting “subject” to mean “to cause to undergo the action of something specified”)
State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (appellate courts reach independent conclusions on statutory interpretation)
State v. Robbins, 253 Neb. 146 (statutory construction—give effect to legislative intent using plain language)
State v. Dominguez, 290 Neb. 477 (standard for sufficiency review: view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
State v. Stricklin, 290 Neb. 542 (motion for new trial reviewed for abuse of discretion)
State v. Loyuk, 289 Neb. 967 (applied analogously to § 28-322.04; cited again for definition of “subject”)
State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55 (harmless error analysis for jury instructions)
State v. McHenry, 250 Neb. 614 (harmless error standard in criminal jury trials)
State v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309 (presumption that jury followed instructions)
State v. Almasaudi, 282 Neb. 162 (motion in limine rulings not preserved absent trial objection)