State v. Wood, 296 Neb. 738

Background

Defendant Robyn J. Wood, a Boys Town shift manager, was convicted by a jury of first degree sexual assault of a protected individual under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-322.04(3) for sexual intercourse with T.Z., a 17-year-old resident in the custody of the State.
Parties agreed Wood and T.Z. fit the statute's definitions of "person" and "protected individual," and that sexual penetration occurred; dispute centered on whether Wood "subjected" T.Z. to penetration.
Evidence: staff observed Wood giving T.Z. preferential treatment and being alone with him; roommate Hutchinson testified Wood admitted multiple kisses and one sexual encounter; Wood's police interview (played at trial) described resisting initially, then ceasing resistance and participating while saying she did not want it.
Jury instruction defined "subject" as "to bring under control or dominion," a narrower definition than the court's later controlling interpretation.
Wood moved for a new trial claiming insufficient evidence that she "subjected" T.Z.; the district court denied the motion and sentenced Wood to 5 years probation.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Wood)	Held
Whether evidence was sufficient to find Wood "subjected" a protected individual to sexual penetration under § 28-322.04	The State: Wood caused the victim to undergo penetration by willingly participating; consent or who effectuated penetration is immaterial under the statute	Wood: T.Z. was the aggressor and effectuated penetration; she did not exercise control or dominion and therefore did not "subject" him	Held: "Subject" means "to cause to undergo the action of something specified." Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational juror could find Wood subjected T.Z.; conviction affirmed
Whether the district court erred by denying Wood's motion for a new trial based on insufficiency	The State: evidence supported the jury verdict; no substantial right was prejudiced	Wood: verdict was against the weight of the evidence and thus a new trial was warranted	Held: Denial of new trial was not an abuse of discretion because evidence supported the conviction
Proper statutory meaning of "subject" in § 28-322.04	The State: statute precludes consent defense; "subject" should be interpreted broadly to capture participation that causes the victim to undergo penetration	Wood: "subject" requires bringing under control or dominion; she did not exercise such control	Held: Court adopts definition from Loyuk — "subject" = "to cause to undergo the action of something specified"
Admissibility of evidence that Wood attended Sexaholics Anonymous (motion in limine)	The State: introduced Wood's volunteered statements in her interview without objection at trial	Wood: sought to exclude evidence of evaluations/treatment and attendance at Sexaholics Anonymous pretrial	Held: Issue not preserved on appeal because Wood did not object at trial to the evidence when introduced

Key Cases Cited

State v. Loyuk, 289 Neb. 967 (interpreting "subject" in related statute to mean "to cause to undergo the action of something specified")
State v. Stricklin, 290 Neb. 542 (standard of review for denial of motion for new trial)
State v. Dominguez, 290 Neb. 477 (standard for sufficiency review — view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
State v. Kolbjornsen, 295 Neb. 231 (appellate review reaches independent conclusions on questions of law)
State v. Robbins, 253 Neb. 146 (statutory construction principles for penal statutes)
State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55 (harmless error analysis for jury instructions)
State v. McHenry, 250 Neb. 614 (harmless error standard in criminal jury trials)
State v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309 (presumption that jury follows given instructions)
State v. Faust, 269 Neb. 749 (standard for granting a new trial — prejudice to substantial right)
State v. Almasaudi, 282 Neb. 162 (preservation rule for motions in limine regarding admissibility)