State v. Wilson, 2022 Ohio 3202

In February 2018 Katherine Wilson was found asleep in the driver’s seat of a parked car with the engine running and the key in the ignition; there was no evidence the car had been moved.
Wilson’s driver’s license was suspended for a prior OVI; she was cited and convicted under R.C. 4510.14(A) (driving/operating under an OVI suspension).
The trial court convicted and sentenced her; the First District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that proof of “operate” under R.C. 4510.14(A) requires evidence of vehicle movement.
The state appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court to resolve whether “operate” for R.C. 4510.14(A) is governed by the court-made Cleary/Gill definition (physical control/key in ignition) or by the statutory definition in R.C. 4511.01(HHH) (requires causing movement).
The Ohio Supreme Court, reviewing statutory interpretation de novo, affirmed the court of appeals and vacated Wilson’s conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does “operate” in R.C. 4510.14(A) include mere physical control (driver’s seat + key/engine running) or require movement of the vehicle?	State: Cleary/Gill definition applies — being in driver’s position with key/engine running suffices to show operation.	Wilson: Definition requiring movement (R.C. 4511.01(HHH)) should govern; no evidence of movement so no violation.	Court: "Operate" for R.C. 4510.14(A) requires causing or having caused movement on public roads; mere physical control is insufficient.
May the statutory movement-based definition in R.C. 4511.01(HHH) (expressly limited to Chapters 4511 and 4513) inform the meaning of “operate” in Chapter 4510?	State: R.C. 4511.01(HHH) does not facially apply to Chapter 4510; Cleary/Gill should control.	Wilson: The statutory definition and the legislature’s creation of a separate physical-control offense show that movement is required.	Court: Even though R.C. 4511.01(HHH) is limited by its terms, its movement-based definition is persuasive contextually and consistent with statutory scheme and common meaning; applied to conclude movement is required.

State v. Cleary, 22 Ohio St.3d 198 (1986) (court held OVI "operate" includes being in driver’s position with key and engine engaged; broad definition aimed at deterrence)
State v. Gill, 70 Ohio St.3d 150 (1994) (reaffirmed Cleary: keys in ignition while in driver’s seat can satisfy "operate" under OVI statute)
State v. McGlone, 59 Ohio St.3d 122 (1991) (applied Cleary principles where keys in ignition but engine off)
Doe v. Marlington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio St.3d 12 (2009) (considered statutory definition of "operate" persuasive outside its textual scope and limited negligent-operation to causing movement)
State v. Pountney, 152 Ohio St.3d 474 (2018) (standard: statutory-interpretation questions reviewed de novo)