489 P.3d 925
N.M.2021Background
- The Governor and Secretary of Health issued a series of COVID-19 public health orders (PHOs) imposing occupancy limits and temporary closures of categories of businesses under the Public Health Emergency Response Act (PHERA).
- Multiple small-business plaintiffs filed suit in district courts across New Mexico seeking just compensation for lost revenues and expenses, alleging the PHOs effectively took or damaged private property.
- The Supreme Court granted a writ of superintending control to resolve the threshold legal question whether (1) Article II, § 20 of the New Mexico Constitution (takings) or (2) PHERA § 12-10A-15 (statutory compensation) authorize recovery for harms caused by PHOs.
- The Court took judicial notice of COVID-19 facts and prior NM decisions (Reeb and Romero) addressing PHOs and police-power authority during the pandemic.
- Holding (summary): (a) PHOs, as currently constituted, do not support a facial claim for just compensation under Article II, § 20; (b) PHERA § 12-10A-15(A) compensates only for property actually taken/appropriated and used for public-health purposes—not business losses from occupancy limits/closures; and (c) claimants under § 12-10A-15(A) must exhaust the administrative process in § 12-10A-15(B) before suing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do the PHOs constitute a compensable taking under Art. II, § 20? | PHOs deprived businesses of property use and income; compensation required. | PHOs are a reasonable exercise of the police power to protect public health and are not a taking. | PHOs cannot support a facial takings claim: reasonable police-power regulation is insulated (nuisance/ public-interest exception); temporary/partial limits weigh against compensation. |
| Does PHERA § 12-10A-15(A) authorize compensation for business losses from PHOs? | "Any other property" should be read broadly to cover business losses and lost revenues. | "Any other property" is limited to property actually taken/appropriated and used for public-health purposes; otherwise would create unlimited liability. | "Any other property" is a functional, use-linked catch-all limited by preceding terms (health care supplies/facilities); business losses from occupancy limits/closures do not qualify absent actual seizure/appropriation. |
| Must claimants exhaust PHERA administrative remedies before judicial relief? | Administrative process is futile or already decided; court review should be allowed. | PHERA expressly requires a preliminary determination by the Attorney General and an appeal procedure; exhaustion is mandatory. | Exhaustion is jurisdictional: claimants under § 12-10A-15(A) must pursue the § 12-10A-15(B)/(C) administrative process before suing. |
| Should courts apply Penn Central ad hoc takings analysis or Lucas categorical rule here? | Plaintiffs seek Penn Central fact-intensive review for partial takings. | State says nuisance/public-health purpose and temporary nature bar Penn Central review on a facial challenge; Lucas only applies to permanent total deprivation. | Penn Central inquiries are inappropriate at the facial stage where PHOs are reasonable police-power measures; Lucas only threatens compensation where there is permanent total deprivation, and background nuisance principles may defeat such claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (U.S. 1905) (upholding state quarantine power and framing deference to public-health measures)
- Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (U.S. 1894) (articulating the two-part reasonableness test for police-power regulations)
- Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (U.S. 1887) (nuisance/public-health regulation need not be treated as a compensable taking)
- Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (U.S. 1922) (Holmes: regulation can go "too far" and become a taking)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (ad hoc factors for regulatory takings)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. 1992) (categorical rule: total deprivation of all economically beneficial use is compensable absent background- law exception)
- Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (U.S. 1987) (nuisance/public-interest rationale can preclude compensation)
- Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (U.S. 2002) (temporary moratoria may not constitute takings)
- Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (U.S. 1928) (destruction of property to prevent greater public harm need not be compensated)
- Reeb v. Lujan Grisham, 480 P.3d 852 (N.M. 2021) (New Mexico Supreme Court decision discussing PHOs and executive authority)
- Romero v. Lujan Grisham, 483 P.3d 545 (N.M. 2021) (New Mexico Supreme Court decision upholding aspects of PHOs and reviewing arbitrary/capricious claims)
