240 A.3d 1140
Md.2020Background:
- Victim Crystal Anderson was murdered; Kearra Bannister told police Wilson confessed involvement, prompting charges against Wilson and co-defendant Posey.
- While jailed awaiting trial, Wilson repeatedly discussed marrying Bannister by recorded calls and video visits; they obtained a marriage license and married by telephone on Feb. 9, 2017, shortly before trials.
- Bannister attempted to invoke the spousal testimonial privilege when called at Posey’s trial; the trial court compelled her testimony; the State sought to preclude the privilege in Wilson I and later did so.
- The State charged Wilson with witness tampering (CR § 9-305) and obstruction of justice (CR § 9-306) for marrying Bannister with alleged corrupt intent to prevent her testimony; a jury convicted on counts related to Wilson I but acquitted as to Posey.
- The Court of Special Appeals reversed for insufficient evidence (finding no “corrupt means”); the Court of Appeals granted certiorari, reinstated the convictions, and held the evidence sufficient because otherwise lawful acts done with corrupt intent may constitute "corrupt means."
- The Court of Appeals also held that witness-tampering and obstruction convictions do not merge for sentencing because CR § 9-305(d) permits separate/consecutive sentences.
Issues:
| Issue | State's Argument | Wilson's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether marrying a potential witness to enable invocation of the spousal testimonial privilege can constitute "corrupt means" supporting witness tampering and obstruction convictions | Lawful acts can be "corrupt means" when done with corrupt intent; recordings show Wilson married Bannister to prevent her testimony | Marriage is lawful; CJ § 9-106 has no sham-marriage exception so the conduct cannot be "corrupt means" | Evidence sufficient; "corrupt means" includes otherwise lawful acts undertaken with corrupt intent (jury could infer intent) |
| Whether a party to a sham/collusive marriage may be precluded from invoking the spousal testimonial privilege | Court need not resolve privilege validity to decide corrupt-intent question; State raised the issue but focused on intent | Bannister may invoke privilege despite sham purpose; statute contains no sham exception | Not decided — Court found the question unnecessary to resolution of sufficiency issue |
| Whether witness tampering conviction merges with obstruction conviction for sentencing | CR § 9-305(d) is an anti-merger provision allowing separate or consecutive sentences | Convictions should merge under required-evidence test, rule of lenity, and fundamental fairness because both arise from one act | No merger; § 9-305(d) permits separate sentences; required-evidence, lenity, and fairness do not mandate merger |
Key Cases Cited
- Romans v. State, 16 A.2d 642 (Md. 1940) (obstruction may include otherwise lawful acts committed with corrupt purpose)
- Hitzelberger v. State, 196 A. 288 (Md. 1938) (otherwise lawful conduct may show corrupt intent to influence judicial process)
- Pagano v. State, 669 A.2d 1339 (Md. 1996) (federal obstruction jurisprudence is instructive for Maryland statute interpretation)
- United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1974) (inducing or advising a witness to invoke the Fifth with corrupt motive can be obstruction)
- United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987) (lawful acts may constitute obstruction if done with corrupt motive)
- United States v. Baker, 611 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1979) (success of the endeavor is not required to prove obstruction)
- Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1964) (advising a witness to invoke privilege can support obstruction conviction)
- Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (interpretation of a different statute with a distinct mens rea; court distinguished its relevance)