State v. Williams
2013 Mo. App. LEXIS 827
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- On Nov. 16, 2009 a gold Pontiac Grand Prix parked near PDQ Title Loans; surveillance showed occupants stayed in the car; shortly after, Andre Williams robbed the store and fled. Police later stopped the gold Pontiac and arrested Lemuel Williams (driver) and Andre (passenger); Andre was identified by the victim.
- Williams claimed he was running errands (Walgreen’s, CD store, Mr. Goodcents) and that Andre had taken the car and committed the robbery without his knowledge; police evidence and timing undermined that account.
- The State charged Williams with first-degree robbery under accomplice liability (acting together with or aiding Andre).
- After a first trial ended in mistrial for juror misconduct, the second jury deadlocked (noting an 11–1 split) and the trial court, after several notes, read the MAI “hammer” instruction; the jury returned a guilty verdict about 1 hour 23 minutes later.
- Williams appealed, arguing (1) the hammer instruction coerced the verdict; (2) insufficient evidence of accomplice liability; (3) improper admission of evidence about a prior uncharged robbery; and (4) plain error in giving a disjunctive accomplice instruction (“acted together with or aided”).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Williams) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Use of hammer instruction after jury reported deadlock | Court properly used MAI hammer instruction after multiple notes and recess; instruction is non-coercive and within discretion | Instruction coerced holdout juror, violating unanimity and due process | Affirmed: no coercion; court acted within discretion (deliberation times and Notes on Use satisfied) |
| 2. Sufficiency of evidence for accomplice liability | Evidence supported inference Williams drove Andre to scene, waited as getaway driver, lied about errands — sufficient for aiding/acting together | Insufficient: Andre alone committed the conduct elements; Williams only a driver or uninvolved | Affirmed: facts (timing, location, false statements) permit reasonable juror to find affirmative participation |
| 3. Admission of prior uncharged-robbery evidence (reason for stop) | Very limited testimony about a prior robbery and association with a similar gold Pontiac was admissible to explain why police pursued/stopped the car | Testimony suggested involvement in prior crime; unfairly prejudicial propensity evidence | Affirmed: testimony limited, not tied to Williams, admissible to explain officer conduct and lawful basis for the stop |
| 4. Verdict director phrasing "acted together with or aided" (disjunctive) | Disjunctive phrasing was harmless: ordinary jurors see the terms as functionally equivalent; prosecutor’s arguments had evidentiary support | Instruction violated Notes on Use; plain error because no evidence Williams committed conduct elements himself and prosecutor argued “acted with” | Affirmed: no plain error — jury focused on aiding/encouraging theory and evidence supported conviction; jury note showed they sought clarification on aiding, not confusion about the disjunctive |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Copple, 51 S.W.3d 11 (Mo. App. 2001) (standards for judge’s discretion and factors for assessing hammer instruction coercion)
- State v. Crawford, 68 S.W.3d 406 (Mo. banc 2002) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- State v. Smith, 108 S.W.3d 714 (Mo. App. 2003) (circumstantial evidence and inferences supporting accomplice affirmative participation)
- State v. Puig, 37 S.W.3d 373 (Mo. App. 2001) (disjunctive accomplice instruction may mislead where prosecutor argues an unsupported "acted together" theory)
- State v. Biggs, 170 S.W.3d 498 (Mo. App. 2005) (accomplice-theory disjunctives generally not prejudicial because jurors need not agree on the precise means of liability)
- State v. Young, 369 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. App. 2012) (ordinary jurors likely treat "acted together with" and "aided" as equivalent; no prejudice where evidence shows affirmative participation)