State v. Williams
111046
| Kan. | Apr 21, 2017Background
- KBI Special Agent Lind used a confidential informant to conduct a controlled buy of methamphetamine from David Williams; Lind wore a body wire that recorded the encounter.
- The informant did not appear at trial; the prosecution played the 4‑minute audio recording for the jury.
- Two brief informant utterances on the recording were contested: a greeting referring to “Dave” (identifying the seller) and the single word “meth” (identifying the substance).
- The district court admitted the recording over Williams’ Confrontation Clause objection, concluding the informant’s statements were nontestimonial and admissible as vicarious admissions.
- Williams was convicted; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Kansas Supreme Court accepted review to decide whether admission of the informant’s recorded statements violated the Sixth Amendment, and whether any error was harmless.
- The Kansas Supreme Court held the two informant statements were testimonial, admission violated the Confrontation Clause, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the other evidentiary proof (agent’s ID, voice ID by another officer, field test, and lab confirmation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Williams) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the informant’s recorded utterances were "testimonial" under the Sixth Amendment | Statements were nontestimonial context or vicarious admissions and therefore admissible; not the product of interrogation or formal statement to police | The informant’s statements were testimonial (made during a controlled buy intended to create evidence) and admitting them without cross‑examination violated the Confrontation Clause | The statements were testimonial (substituted for trial testimony); admission without cross‑examination violated the Confrontation Clause |
| Whether the Brown multifactor test is the exclusive framework for identifying testimonial statements | Brown factors appropriate; informant’s lack of knowledge of recording favors nontestimonial classification | Brown is not exclusive; broader Supreme Court tests (Crawford/Davis primary‑purpose analysis) apply and support finding testimonial | Brown is useful but not exclusive; analysis must identify statements that function as substitutes for trial testimony |
| Whether informant statements offered for "context" escape Confrontation Clause scrutiny | Informant’s utterances merely provided conversational context, not substantive proof | The utterances conveyed substantive facts (identity and that the drug was meth) and were offered for their truth | Context/content distinction is unreliable; these utterances had substantive content and were testimonial |
| Whether any Confrontation Clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Any error was harmless because other, strong evidence independently proved identity and drug substance | Admission of the statements was prejudicial and central to identity/substance proof | Error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given eyewitness ID, voice ID, field test, and lab confirmation |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (limits Confrontation Clause to testimonial statements)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (primary‑purpose test: statements to resolve ongoing emergency are nontestimonial)
- Mich. v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (objective, context‑dependent primary‑purpose inquiry)
- Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (forensic reports can be testimonial; confrontation required)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (testifying witness must have participated in or observed forensic testing for Confrontation Clause)
- Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237 (statements to non‑law‑enforcement can be nontestimonial depending on context and primary purpose)
- State v. Brown, 285 Kan. 261 (Kansas multifactor test for determining testimonial statements)