State v. Williams, 303 Kan. 750

In August 2010 Richard Williams, while intoxicated, told his girlfriend Susan Walton he would kill Judge Benjamin Burgess and "watch him burn in hell," and separately threatened Walton's friend Jodi Jackson.
Walton reported the threats to police; Williams later called Judge Burgess' office twice and left aggressive, threatening messages; Burgess took the threats seriously given their prior history.
The State charged three counts of criminal threat: Count 1 (threat communicated to Walton directed at Walton or Burgess), Count 2 (threat to Burgess’ assistant over the phone), and Count 3 (threat to Walton directed at Jackson).
A jury convicted Williams on Counts 1 and 3, acquitted on Count 2; district court sentenced him to 17 months; Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
Williams appealed arguing (1) Count 1 named two victims and there was insufficient evidence as to one victim (Walton), creating an alternative-means/unanimity problem; and (2) jury was instructed on alternative mental states (intent to terrorize vs. reckless disregard) and the State failed to prove both.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Williams)	Held
Whether naming two victims in Count 1 created alternative means requiring proof as to each victim	Count 1 properly alleged a single communicated threat; naming victims does not create alternative means	Naming Walton and Burgess created alternative means or a unanimity problem because evidence was insufficient as to Walton	Court: Naming multiple potential victims does not create alternative means; a communicated threat is one offense even if perceived by multiple victims; no alternative-means error on that basis
Whether instruction listing two mental states (intent to terrorize or reckless disregard) created alternative means that required separate proof	The statute contemplates either mental state; the State provided sufficient evidence for both mental states on Counts 1 and 3	Jury was instructed on alternative means (intent vs. recklessness) and the State failed to present sufficient evidence of each	Court: K.S.A. 21-3419(a)(1) is ambiguous on legislative intent, apply rule of lenity — mental-state alternatives are alternative means; but the State presented sufficient evidence supporting both intent and recklessness for Counts 1 and 3; convictions affirmed

State v. King, 297 Kan. 955 (court holds a single communicated threat is one offense even if perceived by multiple victims)
State v. Brown, 295 Kan. 181 (explains alternative-means/super-sufficiency rule requiring proof of each alternative means)
State v. Aguirre, 296 Kan. 99 (discusses alternative means based on alternative mental states)
State v. Woolverton, 284 Kan. 59 (criminal threat does not require defendant know the threat will be communicated to the threatened person)
State v. Wright, 259 Kan. 117 (perception and comprehension by someone is required for criminal threat)
State v. Cope, 273 Kan. 642 (relationship between parties is relevant to reckless-disregard analysis)
Alires v. McGehee, 277 Kan. 398 (appellate court may affirm while disagreeing with panel analysis)
State v. Coman, 294 Kan. 84 (rule of lenity applies when statute reasonably supports two interpretations)
State v. Horn, 288 Kan. 690 (rule of lenity directive for ambiguous criminal statutes)
State v. Ta, 296 Kan. 230 (mens rea and actus reus both required for offense)