State v. William Hill, 307 A.3d 1157

Background

William Hill was charged with carjacking after the victim, A.Z., picked his photo from a police array.
While detained awaiting trial, Hill sent a letter to A.Z. at her home, expressing his innocence and asking her to be truthful if unsure about his identity as the perpetrator.
A.Z. found the letter unsettling, was scared to testify, and turned the letter over to police, leading to a new charge of third-degree witness tampering under N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).
At trial, the State focused on the letter's contents as evidence of witness tampering; Hill was convicted of both carjacking and witness tampering.
The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions, finding the statute neither overbroad nor vague and rejecting Hill's constitutional arguments.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review limited to whether the witness tampering statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.

Issues

Issue	Hill's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Is N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) unconstitutionally overbroad?	Statute criminalizes protected speech under the First Amendment, is overbroad unless intent to obstruct is required.	Statute targets conduct, rarely applies to protected speech, regulates mainly unprotected conduct or speech integral to criminal acts.	Statute is not facially overbroad; protected speech prosecutions are rare compared to legitimate lawful applications.
Was the statute unconstitutionally applied to Hill?	Convicted for content of innocuous letter without proof of intent to obstruct, violating free speech rights.	Prosecution focused on the conduct of sending the letter, showing Hill knew where A.Z. lived and not on the actual content.	Conviction vacated; prosecution was content-based, and jury was not properly instructed to find intent for speech integral to criminal conduct.
Does a defendant awaiting trial have a First Amendment right to communicate with the victim?	Yes, unless speech falls within a historic First Amendment exception.	No, communication meant to influence a witness by a defendant awaiting trial has no First Amendment protection.	Not all defendant communications with victims are unprotected; protected unless they fall into traditional unprotected categories.
Should the tampering charge be dismissed with prejudice?	Yes; no evidence that the letter was intended to tamper with a witness.	No; a reasonable jury could find intent to pressure the witness, so a retrial is appropriate.	Charge not dismissed; remanded for new trial on witness tampering, but carjacking conviction stands.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762 (2023) (on the facial overbreadth doctrine and the standard for facial constitutional challenges)
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023) (First Amendment "true threats" exception requires a mental state of recklessness)
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (historic categories of unprotected speech; courts cannot create new ones solely based on value judgments)
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (speech that is part of criminal conduct is unprotected)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (criminal conduct through speech does not gain constitutional protection)
Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. (2018) (First Amendment applies to the states)
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (2014) (distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral speech regulations)