State v. Wilcoxon, 341 P.3d 1019

Wilcoxon and Nollette were charged after a May 23, 2013 burglary at Lancer Lanes Casino; Wilcoxon worked there, Nollette did not.
Preceding week, the targets discussed Lancer Lanes as a target due to poor security; an earlier attempted burglary involved a bagged intruder cutting power to the surveillance system.
During the May 22–23 burglary, a single burglar wearing a bag entered and stole $29,074 after cutting power; surveillance captured Nollette on a phone call with Wilcoxon at 2:02 a.m. during the crime.
Cell records showed Wilcoxon and Nollette spoke during the burglary, including a 1:59 a.m. call routed through a nearby cell tower.
Sometime after 2:00 a.m., Wilcoxon and Nollette went to a friend Bomar’s home; Wilcoxon admitted pulling off the Lancer job and described the burglary.
Wilcoxon moved to sever trials from Nollette’s; the court denied, and no renewal of severance was made at trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nollette’s out-of-court statements to Solem implicate Wilcoxon under Bruton	Wilcoxon relies on Bruton to require severance or limiting instruction.	Nollette’s statements are testimonial and should be excluded or severed.	No Bruton violation; statements not testimonial; severance not required.
Whether the court had a sua sponte duty to give a limiting instruction	Limiting instruction should have been given to curb prejudice.	No failure when not requested; no constitutional error.	No sua sponte duty; failure to give instruction not reversible error absent request.
Whether cell tower testimony by Sergeant Denny required expert qualification or a continuance	Tower testimony needed a qualified expert; continuance should have been granted.	Sergeant testified as lay witness about general cell-tower routing; no expert needed.	Admission proper; no abuse of discretion; no reversible error.
Whether denial of continuance prejudiced Wilcoxon	Continuance was necessary to prepare expert testimony on cell towers.	Trial proceeded without expert testimony; denial was within court discretion.	Harmless error or not reversible; decision affirmed.

Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (codefendant’s statements implicating other defendant require severance or limiting instructions)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay defined; confrontation clause protection depends on witness testimony)
State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51 (1991) (CrR 4.4(c) severance rules for codefendants)
State v. Shafer, 156 Wn.2d 381 (2006) (testimonial nature depends on declarant’s expectation of use against accused)
State v. Noyes, 69 Wn.2d 441 (1966) (limiting instructions not required sua sponte; need request to preserve error)
State v. Russell, 171 Wn.2d 118 (2011) (limiting instructions not given absent request; waiver rule)
State v. Athan, 160 Wn.2d 354 (2007) (omission of limiting instruction not reversible when not requested)
State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26 (1997) (limiting instruction absence not reversible absent request)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-error doctrine for constitutional violations)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (emphasizes non-testimonial government interactions in certain statements)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (testimonial/non-testimonial distinctions in hearsay)