State v. White
384 P.3d 13
| Kan. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Defendant Vance White, proceeding pro se in a contentious divorce, made multiple angry communications (emails and phone calls) to his ex-wife's attorney, law office staff, and the Attorney General's victim services, threatening to "start holy hell war" and saying he'd "fuck her up." Law enforcement evacuated the courthouse and law office and later arrested White.
- White was charged with two counts aggravated criminal threat, two counts telephone harassment, and one count stalking; jury convicted on two aggravated criminal threat counts, one harassment, and one stalking; one harassment count acquitted.
- At trial White argued his statements were political speech or conditional/venting (not true threats) and testified he did not intend actual violence; he contended the threats grew in severity as they were relayed.
- During closing, the prosecutor called White’s defense "ridiculous." White did not object at trial to the comment or to the jury instruction language challenged on appeal.
- White appealed raising four claims: prosecutorial error (closing), improper jury instruction (use of "should" in PIK Crim. 4th 51.010), vagueness of K.S.A. 21-5415(a)(1), and overbreadth of that statute.
- The court affirmed: found no prejudicial prosecutorial error, upheld the PIK instruction, and held the criminal-threat statute neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad (statute targets "true threats").
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prosecutorial error for calling defense “ridiculous” in closing | Word was outside proper prosecutorial latitude and prejudiced White's right to fair trial | Comment fell within permissible argument attacking credibility and did not affect outcome; no contemporaneous objection | No reversible error; word "ridiculous" not prejudicial under entire record |
| Jury instruction PIK Crim. 4th 51.010 uses "should" (alleged mandatory) | "Should" is imperative and directs verdict for State, impairing jury nullification | "Should" is advisory, not mandatory; courts have approved PIK language | Instruction legally proper; use of "should" not clear error and did not direct verdict |
| Vagueness challenge to K.S.A. 21-5415(a)(1) (term "fear") | "Fear" is ambiguous and could criminalize unreasonable or unrelated fears, violating due process | "Fear" has common meaning (apprehension of harm); statute targets threats to commit violence and focuses on defendant's intent | Statute is not unconstitutionally vague; a person of ordinary intelligence can understand the prohibition |
| Overbreadth challenge to K.S.A. 21-5415(a)(1) (First Amendment) | Statute may criminalize protected speech beyond true threats (facial and as-applied) | Statute targets true threats (serious expression of intent to commit violence); hypothetical harmless examples do not show overbreadth | Statute not overbroad; it narrowly covers true threats and survives facial and as-applied challenge |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Douglas, 274 Kan. 96 (attacking credibility in closing may be permissible; no reversible error where argument aimed to show defense not practicable)
- State v. Anderson, 294 Kan. 450 (prosecutorial comment review allowed on appeal)
- State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 (harmlessness standard for constitutional error)
- State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102 (presumption of constitutionality; statutory interpretation to preserve validity)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (true threats doctrine allows prohibition of serious expressions of intent to commit unlawful violence)