State v. White, 2012 Tenn. LEXIS 153

Defendant Jason White was convicted at trial of burglary, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping arising from a January 8, 2008 White Castle robbery in Clarksville, Tennessee.
Defense argued the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction violated due process under Anthony/Dixon framework because the movement of the victim was essentially incidental to the underlying robbery.
The trial court denied the motion to set aside the kidnapping conviction, and the defendant was sentenced to an effective 25-year term, with parole-related consecutive timing.
The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, dismissing the kidnapping conviction on due process grounds, prompting the State to seek Supreme Court review.
The Court ultimately held that the kidnapping statutes do not apply to victim movement that is essentially incidental to an accompanying felony, and remanded for a new trial with proper jury instructions on the incidental-vs-significant movement issue.
The decision overruled earlier Anthony-based due process analysis and required juries to determine, with specific instructions, whether kidnapping movement is essentially incidental to the accompanying felony

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Anthony and Dixon-based due process analysis governs kidnapping tied to another felony.	White argues Anthony/Dixon framework still governs due process.	State contends current statutes render due process analysis unnecessary.	Anthony/Dixon framework overruled; jury determines incidental vs substantial movement.
Do Tennessee kidnapping statutes exclude movement incidental to another felony from separate kidnapping liability?	State contends statutes sufficiently restrict to prevent incidental movement from supporting kidnapping.	White contends incidental movement can nonetheless support kidnapping.	Yes; statutes construed to exclude incidental movement from kidnapping liability; remand for new trial with proper instructions.
Who should determine whether movement was incidental or substantial, and what instructions are needed?	Jury should decide under standard instructions.	Jury sufficiency should be reviewed under traditional sufficiency standards.	Jury must determine incidental vs substantial movement; trial court must give explicit guidance; remand for new trial.
Is the double jeopardy analysis implicated by multiple offenses resolved by the new standard?	Dixon/Denton concerns may apply.	Text of statute and due process approach suffices.	The decision clarifies due process sufficiency and limits reliance on Anthony-based tests; not a new dual-jeopardy rule.

State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) (due process limits on kidnapping when movement is incidental to another crime)
State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997) (four-factor double jeopardy analysis replacing Anthony approach (overruled here))
State v. Richardson, 251 S.W.3d 438 (Tenn. 2008) (four-factor test for same-offense analysis)
State v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242 (Tenn. 2001) (jury instruction on kidnapping and accompanying felony)
State v. Fuller, 172 S.W.3d 533 (Tenn. 2005) (clarified Dixon framework and incidental movement analysis)
Salamon v. State, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008) (jury should determine whether restraint is incidental or independent of assault)
Hines v. State, 75 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (courts distinguish substantial interference in restraint cases)
State v. Harrison, 270 S.W.3d 21 (Tenn. 2008) (temporary procedural ruling on discovery in competency proceedings)