State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395

Defendant Wessells was arrested Sept. 3, 2006 on an outstanding traffic warrant and questioned about a triple homicide; he was Mirandized and signed a waiver before the Sept. 3 interrogation which ended after he invoked counsel and he was released on bail.
Police continued the homicide investigation; two survivors were interviewed and identified defendant, leading to Sept. 12, 2006 custody for further questioning; the Sept. 12 interrogation was recorded and again he waived rights.
Defendant later moved to suppress statements from both interrogations; the trial court found invocation of the right to counsel on Sept. 3 and suppression was improper for Sept. 3 but proper for Sept. 12.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the break in custody dissolved Edwards v. Arizona protections and that reinitiation after a break does not automatically violate rights.
The Court granted remand to determine whether the Edwards/McNeil framework or the Shatzer rule governs retroactivity and whether the 9-day break before Sept. 12 was sufficient to suppress the statements.
The Court ultimately held that Shatzer applies retroactively to a defendant not yet tried, and the Sept. 12 statements must be suppressed under the break-in-custody rule.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Shatzer applies retroactively to suppress Sept. 12 statements.	State: Shatzer is prospective; break-in-custody rule is not retroactive.	Wessells: Shatzer should apply retroactively because not yet tried.	Yes; Shatzer applies retroactively; Sept. 12 statements suppressed.
What is the effect of a break in custody shorter than 14 days under Shatzer?	State: Breaks under McNeil/ Eddy frameworks may suffice.	Wessells: Shatzer’s 14-day rule is a clear bar.	Break shorter than 14 days cannot purge taint; 9-day break insufficient.
Did the Sept. 3 invocation of counsel terminate questioning and restart on Sept. 12?	State: Sept. 3 ended inquiry; Sept. 12 proper reinitiation.	Wessells: Invocation caused a break, so Sept. 12 was tainted.	Invocation ended Sept. 3 interrogation; Sept. 12 tainted.
Is a bright-line 14-day rule required, or may other factors govern under Shatzer retroactivity?	State: Shatzer is not a constitutional mandate; prospective.	Wessells: Shatzer should apply retroactively.	Court adopts bright-line 14-day rule as controlling.
Should Shatzer be applied in New Jersey under state retroactivity principles?	State: apply under state retroactivity rules.	Wessells: apply under Griffith three-part test.	Shatzer applied; defendant entitled to benefit.

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (right to counsel; no further interrogation after invocation unless counsel is available)
Roberson v. United States, 486 U.S. 675 (U.S. 1988) (Edwards rule extends to subsequent interrogations)
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (U.S. 1990) (invocation of counsel preserves right; separate interrogations)
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1991) (break in custody exception to Edwards; test for taint focus on duration/conduct)
Edwards v. Arizona and its “bright-line” rule, — (—) (invoke right to counsel; no further questioning until counsel present)
Shatzer v. Maryland, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (recognizes a 14-day break in custody as a prophylaxis to taint; retroactivity issue decided in favor of defendant)
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (U.S. 1987) (retroactivity of new rules for cases pending on direct review)
Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1980) (retroactivity/constitutional limits of applying new rules)
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (U.S. 2009) (Sixth Amendment; overruled Jackson; interplay with Miranda/Edwards)