State v. Wendt, 341 P.3d 893

Background

Indictment (Dec 17, 2009) charged defendant with first-degree manslaughter, two counts of third-degree assault, and DUII; defendant was arraigned Dec 19, 2009 and released on bail.
Defendant filed ten pretrial motions beginning July 12, 2010; evidentiary hearings spanned Oct 2010–Feb 18, 2011; the court issued rulings May 26, 2011.
Trial was scheduled Dec 12, 2011, but prosecution disclosed late a 3+ hour bar video (received Dec 8, 2011) capturing defendant’s conversation; court continued trial to allow defense review.
Multiple scheduling continuances and docket congestion produced total delay of 952 days from indictment to last trial date; court attributed 647 days to the state (net/unconsented delay ≈ 21.5 months).
Trial court dismissed the DUII count under former ORS 135.747 as unreasonable delay (statute of limitations had run), and dismissed manslaughter/assault counts with prejudice under Article I, §10 and the Sixth Amendment for asserted prejudice (evaporation of witness memory; anxiety).
Court of Appeals reversed, holding the unconsented delay was reasonable under former ORS 135.747 and that defendant failed to prove the required prejudice for constitutional speedy-trial claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal of DUII under former ORS 135.747 was required because net delay was unreasonable	Net unconsented delay (≈21.5 months) was justified by scheduling, prosecutorial continuances, and docket constraints; not unreasonable in toto	Delay attributed largely to the state; in toto delay roughly equaled criminal-limitation period for DUII and was therefore unreasonable	Reversed: unconsented 21.5-month delay was reasonable under former ORS 135.747 and not prejudicial enough to mandate dismissal
Proper allocation of delays between defendant and state (motions, continuances, court setovers)	Many periods were attributable to the state (continuances, scheduling, late disclosure); certain setovers should be state responsibility	Defendant consented to reasonable delays by filing numerous pretrial motions; some setovers were defendant-initiated	Court of Appeals held allocations largely correct for appeal purposes: several delays attributed to state but many motion-related and under-advisement delays were reasonable and attributable to defendant
Whether Article I, §10 speedy-trial violation occurred based on delay and prejudice	Even if delay long, individual delays were justified; defendant failed to show non-speculative prejudice to defense or excessive pretrial incarceration	Delay impaired defense by causing witness memory fade and preventing identification of people on video; anxiety and life disruption support dismissal	Reversed: defendant failed to show reasonable possibility of prejudice from lost/worn memories or identification; anxiety alone insufficient to require dismissal
Whether Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim warrants dismissal	Federal right parallels state analysis; no showing of meaningful prejudice or incarceration	Delay violated Sixth Amendment because it impaired defense and caused anxiety	Reversed: same reasons as Article I §10—no reasonable possibility of prejudice established; Sixth Amendment claim fails

Key Cases Cited

State v. Johnson, 342 Or. 596 (discussing burden and non-speculative prejudice requirement for constitutional speedy-trial claims)
State v. Adams, 339 Or. 104 (comparing in-toto delay to statute of limitations for reasonableness under statutory speedy-trial framework)
State v. Emery, 318 Or. 460 (three-category prejudice test under Article I, §10)
State v. McDonnell, 343 Or. 557 (requiring showing that missing witnesses/evidence would have been useful, applied to constitutional and state claims)
State v. Ellis, 263 Or. App. 250 (statutory speedy-trial analysis and net/unconsented delay approach)
State v. Harberts, 331 Or. 72 (statutory dismissal consequences under former ORS 135.747)