State v. Webster, 2013 ND 119

Police responded to an 83-year-old woman’s report of a sexual assault; entry was through a broken garage window. A man later identified as Nick Webster was observed nearby, questioned, and taken to the law enforcement center for custodial interrogation.
Webster was separately interrogated in two recorded interview rooms by Officers Leintz and Klauzer; signs in the rooms warned conversations may be recorded.
During the interrogations Webster was not told that anything he said could be used against him in court, nor was he told an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one.
Webster moved to suppress statements, arguing he was not given full Miranda warnings; the State conceded those specific advisements were not given but argued the warnings were adequate in context and that Webster waived his rights.
The district court denied suppression, finding sufficient Miranda warnings and that Webster knowingly waived his rights; Webster then conditionally pled guilty and appealed.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota reversed, holding the Miranda warnings were inadequate (failure to advise statements could be used in court) and remanded to allow Webster to withdraw his conditional plea.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were Webster’s Miranda warnings adequate?	Warnings given in parts plus Webster’s familiarity with the system amounted to a full equivalent.	Officers failed to advise that statements could be used against him and did not advise appointment of counsel if indigent.	Warnings were inadequate because officers did not tell Webster his statements could be used against him.
Did Webster knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive Miranda rights?	Webster voluntarily spoke; no coercion, so waiver valid despite incomplete warnings.	Waiver is ineffective when warnings omitted key advisements required to convey consequences.	Waiver was invalid because Webster lacked full awareness of the consequences due to inadequate warnings.
Can prior experience with the justice system substitute for giving full Miranda warnings?	State argued prior contact supported awareness of rights.	Webster argued prior experience does not replace required contemporaneous warnings.	Prior experience cannot substitute; an on-the-record warning is required.
Is it necessary to decide whether failure to advise of appointed counsel was harmless?	State relied on Walden to argue harmlessness where indigency not shown.	Webster preserved challenge to full warnings; primary error was omission re: use-against advisement.	Court found omission re: use-against dispositive and did not decide the appointed-counsel harmlessness issue.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (sets forth required custodial warnings)
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (warnings need not be verbatim but must reasonably convey rights)
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (substance, not form, controls adequacy of warnings)
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (voluntariness of confession requires coercive police activity)
United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (omission that statements may be used in court renders warnings deficient)
State v. Walden, 336 N.W.2d 629 (N.D. 1983) (defendant’s cutting off of warnings may constitute waiver; harmlessness analysis where indigency not shown)
State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D. 1987) (Miranda protections under state and federal constitutions)