State v. Weaving, 125 Conn. App. 41

Defendant Weaving drove around 80 mph in fog on Route 69, a two-lane residential road, in a failed passing maneuver.
He crossed into the northbound lane and struck a cyclist standing near the center of the lane with no headlamp or light.
The bicycle and vehicle damage, along with victim injuries, supported the theory that the speed was excessive; the boy died from the injuries.
Defendant was charged with manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the second degree; he was convicted of the latter.
The trial included competing speed-related expert testimony: a prosecution accident-reconstruction expert and defense psychologist on reaction time.
On appeal, defendant challenges prosecutorial impropriety, a jury instruction on the duty to assume others will obey the law, and the absence of a headlamp issue in recklessness analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Prosecutorial impropriety in closing	Prosecutor reasonably inferred recklessness from evidence like injuries and damage.	Prosecutor invited speculation beyond the evidence about defendant's speed.	No improper conduct; arguments were grounded in evidence and reasonable inferences.
Instruction on road-user expectation and recklessness	The defense asked to tell jurors they could assume others would obey the law; this was central to recklessness.	Court should have given a reasonable-assumptions instruction about others obeying traffic rules.	Campbell governs; no error in refusing the requested instruction; proper recklessness instruction given.
Headlamp absence and recklessness/intervening causation	Evidence of no headlamp could be argued as part of perception/reaction in recklessness.	Defense should be allowed to argue lack of headlamp on victim affected perception and causation.	Court properly limited headlamp argument as it concerned intervening causation and did not require inclusion in recklessness instruction.

State v. Gould, 290 Conn. 70 (2009) (two-step analysis for prosecutorial impropriety and due process; Williams factors)
State v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671 (1910) (jury decides reasonable assumptions; no strict legal rule requiring such instructions)
State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106 (1995) (victim's negligence not a defense to culpable mental state; causation considerations)
State v. Lizzi, 199 Conn. 462 (1986) (prosecutor may invite reasonable inferences from evidence)
State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364 (2003) (limits on a prosecutor inviting speculation beyond evidence)