State v. Washington, 186 Conn. App. 176

Background

On Feb. 19, 2014 three men (Davis, Washington, and "Dough") went to 33 Seyms St., Hartford; Davis and Washington carried handguns. They intended to break into a first‑floor apartment (targeting a resident called "300") and steal money.
The men approached the apartment door; Washington knocked and used a ruse to make the occupant begin to open the door; Washington tried to force entry but the occupant shut the door. The men left the building and, when taunted from the apartment window and confronted by a man at the building entrance, Davis and Washington fired shots toward the building; no one was injured.
Surveillance video and witness Jhllah Govan implicated Davis; Davis confessed, identified Washington as a shooter, pleaded guilty and cooperated at trial.
Washington was tried by a jury and convicted of conspiracy to commit home invasion, attempt to commit home invasion, and related robbery and assault charges; he received an aggregate 40‑year sentence (execution suspended after 30 years) plus probation.
On appeal Washington challenged (1) sufficiency of the evidence for conspiracy and attempt to commit home invasion, and (2) instructional error because the trial court repeatedly used the word "building" instead of the statutory term "dwelling" in jury instructions. The court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency — conspiracy to commit home invasion	State: Davis's testimony and corroborating facts (travel together, purchased guns, plan to steal money, attempted forced entry) support inference of agreement and intent to commit home invasion.	Washington: Evidence insufficient to show an agreement to commit home invasion specifically (rather than some other crime); mainly relies on Davis (a co‑conspirator who pleaded for a deal).	Affirmed — jury could reasonably credit Davis; joint travel, shared weapons, common plan, and conduct at the door supported finding of agreement and specific intent to commit home invasion.
Sufficiency — attempt to commit home invasion	State: Knocking, using a ruse to induce opening, trying to force entry while armed are substantial steps strongly corroborative of intent to commit home invasion.	Washington: No actual entry occurred, so no substantial step or intent to commit home invasion was proven.	Affirmed — attempted forced entry while armed and acting pursuant to the plan satisfied the substantial‑step and intent elements for attempt.
Jury instruction — use of "building" vs. statutory "dwelling"	State: Erroneous substitutions were not prejudicial because written instructions largely used correct term, trial evidence made clear the target was a first‑floor apartment (a dwelling), and counsel did not object.	Washington: Repeated oral substitutions of "building" could have diluted the dwelling element, permitting conviction based on entry into common building areas rather than the occupied apartment.	Affirmed — error acknowledged but harmless; overall oral and written charge reasonably conveyed that the crime required entering a dwelling; not reasonably possible the jury was misled; no plain‑error reversal warranted.
Reviewability (Golding/plain error)	N/A	Washington: Claim unpreserved; requests Golding review or reversal under plain error.	Court: Claim reviewable under Golding prongs 1–2 but fails prong 3 (no deprivation of fair trial); plain‑error relief likewise denied.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Allan, 311 Conn. 1 (discussing standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
State v. Padua, 273 Conn. 138 (conspiracy requires intent to bring about elements of the conspired offense)
State v. Serrano, 91 Conn. App. 227 (substantial‑step analysis for attempted burglary/forced entry)
State v. McClam, 44 Conn. App. 198 (defer to jury credibility determinations)
State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 (four‑part test for review of unpreserved constitutional claims)
In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 (modification of Golding framework)
State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435 (jury instructions must be read as whole; harmlessness standard)
State v. Holley, 174 Conn. App. 488 (written instructions mitigate oral inaccuracies)
State v. Aponte, 259 Conn. 512 (failure to instruct on an essential element implicates constitutional rights)
State v. Brown, 132 Conn. App. 251 (double jeopardy principles referenced in sentencing/charge resolution)