180 Conn. App. 291
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- On Oct. 28, 2012, defendant Eugene Walker (nickname GZ) participated in an attempted robbery in a parking lot; the victim was shot and later died. A black bandana was recovered from the victim’s Acura.
- State forensic examiner Heather Degnan extracted a mixed DNA profile from the bandana and compared it to "known" profiles produced by another laboratory group; Degnan concluded Walker was a major contributor and cosigned a report that was admitted at trial.
- Alexis Morrison (M), who knew Walker by his nickname, identified him in the prosecutor’s office from a photograph on the prosecutor’s desk and later made an in-court identification; defense learned of the office identification during trial.
- Several out-of-court statements by codefendants and witnesses were admitted under the coconspirator exception and other hearsay exceptions (party-opponent, Whelan), and some statements were conditionally received subject to later foundation.
- Walker was convicted of felony murder, manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm, attempted first‑degree robbery, and criminal possession of a pistol; he appealed claiming confrontation, due process/identification, hearsay/conspiracy foundation, severance (Bruton), evidentiary, and double jeopardy errors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Walker) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Confrontation — DNA testimony | Degnan conducted the critical comparison and was available to testify and be cross‑examined; experts may rely on colleagues’ work. | Admission of Degnan’s testimony about a known profile generated by another analyst violated the Sixth Amendment because that analyst did not testify. | Court: No Confrontation violation; Degnan conducted/ explained the comparison, relied on standard procedures, and was cross‑examined. |
| Identification / Mistrial (Morrison) | Morrison’s ID was spontaneous from prior familiarity, not a suggestive police procedure; any late disclosure caused no prejudice. | Pretrial ID in prosecutor’s office was unduly suggestive and nondisclosure required striking her ID or mistrial. | Court: No due process violation; pretrial contact not suggestive state action and no discovery violation shown or prejudice proved. |
| Coconspirator hearsay (Vessichio foundation) | The court conditionally admitted statements and the state later produced independent evidence (DNA, cell records, witnesses) sufficient to establish conspiracy and participation by preponderance. | Admission was improper because the court used the very hearsay to find the conspiracy; insufficient independent evidence linked Walker to conspiracy. | Court: Admission proper; conditional admission permissible and the court relied on independent evidence to satisfy Vessichio. |
| Severance / Bruton concerns | Joint trial appropriate; statements admitted were either admissible against Walker (coconspirator, party‑opponent) or redacted/limited so no Bruton prejudice. | Statements and Whelan evidence against codefendant were inadmissible against Walker and required severance. | Court: Denial of severance not an abuse; no substantial prejudice shown and limiting instructions/redaction avoided Bruton problem. |
| Foundation / chain of custody for photograph, bandana, DNA | Witness Murray was competent to authenticate the photo and identify the bandana; chain of custody shown with reasonable probability against tampering. | Photograph and bandana lacked proper foundation and chain of custody (conflicting inventory, first officer didn’t see bandana). | Court: Evidence admissible; witness authentication sufficed for photo and chain shown with reasonable certainty for bandana and derived DNA. |
| Double jeopardy — multiple homicide convictions | N/A (state conceded issue) | Conviction of both felony murder and first‑degree manslaughter arising from same act violates double jeopardy. | Court: Manslaughter conviction vacated; remand for resentencing consistent with vacatur. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay generally inadmissible absent opportunity for confrontation)
- Melendez‑Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (certificates of analysis are testimonial and analysts must be available for confrontation)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (forensic report admission requires testimony from the analyst who actually performed the test unless other confrontation safeguards exist)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (experts may rely on out‑of‑court data and relate them to the jury without confrontation when used to explain opinion rather than to prove truth)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (codefendant confession inadmissible against defendant at joint trial if it directly incriminates defendant)
- State v. Vessichio, 197 Conn. 644 (1985) (establishes preponderance independent‑evidence foundation for coconspirator hearsay exception)
- State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242 (2013) (trial court must vacate conviction of lesser included offense when both greater and lesser are convicted)
- State v. Miranda, 317 Conn. 741 (2015) (Polanco rule extended to multiple homicide convictions based on a single act)