191 So. 3d 484
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- Two consolidated appeals (Liles and Willis) challenged suppression of warrantless blood draws taken after fatal- crash DUI investigations in 2011–2012.
- Officers had probable cause to believe the drivers were impaired and invoked Florida’s implied-consent statute, §316.1933(1)(a), commanding blood draws and permitting reasonable force; both suspects initially refused but ultimately submitted after being told blood could be taken forcibly.
- Trial courts suppressed the blood-test results, finding no warrant, no valid consent, and no exigent circumstances as required by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. McNeely.
- The State argued the statute supplied a general exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; alternatively, it relied on exigency or statutory implied consent.
- The Fifth District agreed that neither actual consent nor exigent circumstances under McNeely justified the warrantless draws, but reversed suppression under the Leon good-faith exception because officers reasonably relied on then-binding Florida precedent and §316.1933 before McNeely.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §316.1933(1)(a) alone authorizes warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws post-McNeely | Statute creates a general exception permitting mandatory warrantless draws in fatal/serious-injury crashes | Statute does not supplant Fourth Amendment; implied consent isn’t actual, voluntary consent | No — statute must be applied consistent with McNeely; warrant, consent, or exigency required |
| Whether defendants consented to the draws | Implied consent statutory scheme supplies authority for the draws | Drivers revoked implied consent by refusing; no voluntary, actual consent | No actual consent; implied consent revocable and not a per se Fourth Amendment exception |
| Whether exigent circumstances justified warrantless draws | Natural dissipation of alcohol and seriousness of crash create exigency | McNeely rejects per se exigency from metabolization; no individualized exigent proof presented | No exigency shown under McNeely; officers offered no other emergency factors |
| Whether suppression should be avoided under the good-faith exception (Leon) | Officers reasonably relied on §316.1933 and pre-McNeely precedent; exclusion would not deter misconduct | Defendants: exclusion appropriate despite officer reliance | Yes — exclusionary rule inapplicable under Leon/Krull; evidence admissible due to objectively reasonable good-faith reliance |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (U.S. 2013) (natural metabolization of alcohol does not create per se exigency; exigency is case-specific)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (U.S. 1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule for objectively reasonable police reliance)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search; exigency justified warrantless draw where delay would dissipate evidence)
- Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (U.S. 1946) (consent is a recognized exception to warrant requirement)
- Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (U.S. 1987) (exclusionary rule may not apply when officers reasonably rely on statute later declared invalid)