539 S.W.3d 289
Tex. Crim. App.2018Background
- Victoria Velasquez filed a timely motion to suppress; trial was set for April 13, 2015 after a continuance. The State had received and acknowledged the motion three weeks earlier.
- On the morning of trial, after both sides announced ready, the trial judge elected to hear the motion to suppress before empaneling the jury.
- The State objected, claiming insufficient notice under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 28.01 because its officers were not present and it was not prepared for a pre-trial hearing.
- The trial judge overruled the notice objection, warned the prosecutor that refusing to offer evidence could result in ruling for the defense, and the prosecutor declined to present evidence; the judge granted the motion to suppress.
- The Fourth Court of Appeals held Article 28.01 required additional notice and reversed; the State sought discretionary review.
- The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of appeals, holding Article 28.01's formal-notice requirement applies only when the court sets a separate pre-trial setting, not when the court hears pre-trial matters on the trial day.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Velasquez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Art. 28.01 requires additional notice when a pre-trial hearing (motion to suppress) is heard on the day of trial | Art. 28.01 entitles the State to formal notice of a pre-trial hearing so it can have witnesses present and prepare | The trial setting combined with the filed motion gave the State sufficient notice; judge may decide to hear suppression issues on trial day | The statute's formal-notice requirement applies only when the court "sets" a separate pre-trial hearing; no additional notice was required for a hearing conducted on the trial setting |
| Whether the State preserved error by objecting on notice grounds vs. evidentiary grounds | Objected that it lacked notice under Art. 28.01 and so preserved error | Velasquez argued the State merely objected to evidentiary character and did not preserve Art. 28.01 error | Court resolved case on statutory-interpretation ground and did not reach preservation question |
| Whether trial court abused discretion by deciding suppression without State evidence present | State argued unfair denial of opportunity to present witnesses arose from lack of Art. 28.01 notice | Velasquez pointed out State had the report and refused to offer evidence; trial judges may conduct informal suppression hearings | Court declined to address on merits because State never argued ruling was arbitrary or outside zone of reasonable disagreement; declined to reverse on that basis |
| Scope of Article 28.01 notice: "set" for pre-trial vs. any pre-trial action on trial day | State urged broad reading: any pre-trial hearing triggers formal notice obligations | Velasquez urged narrow reading: Article governs distinct pre-trial settings, not actions taken on the trial setting | Court adopted narrow reading: Article 28.01 applies when the court "sets" a separate pre-trial hearing, not when it hears matters on the trial setting |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (statutory-construction principles; give effect to plain language)
- Postell v. State, 693 S.W.2d 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (interpretation of Art. 28.01 notice and filing rules)
- Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (motions to suppress are often informal and judges may use varied information to resolve them)
- Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (textual rules of statutory construction; give meaning to every word)
- State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (standard for reversing trial-court suppression rulings: arbitrary or outside zone of reasonable disagreement)