State v. Urbanowski, 163 Conn.App. 377

Victim Patricia Staveski was assaulted by Michael Urbanowski after he repaired her car; the attack involved beating, dragging, threats to kill, and later strangulation inside her car, causing serious long-term injuries.
Urbanowski was tried by jury and convicted of second‑degree assault, second‑degree strangulation, second‑degree breach of the peace, and second‑degree threatening; later pleaded nolo contendere to persistent serious felony offender allegations.
At sentencing the court imposed consecutive seven‑year terms for assault and strangulation (total effective sentence 14 years plus special parole).
Defense raised (on appeal) two principal claims: (1) double jeopardy/statutory bar to convicting both assault and strangulation for the same incident; and (2) erroneous admission of prior uncharged misconduct (testimony by Suzanne Schulman about a 2002 choking).
Trial court allowed limited prior‑bad‑act testimony solely for intent (later narrowed to intent only), and gave limiting instructions; defense objected and moved to strike after testimony.
Appellate court affirmed convictions: rejected double jeopardy claim because assault and strangulation were distinct acts at different locations/times during the episode; found admission of Schulman testimony erroneous but harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether convicting and sentencing for both 2d‑degree assault and 2d‑degree strangulation violated § 53a‑64bb(b) or double jeopardy	The acts supporting each charge were distinct: blunt‑force assaults (inside house/driveway) producing serious injury supported assault; later manual neck compression in car supported strangulation	The convictions/punishments arose from the same act/transaction so convicting and punishing both violated the statute and double jeopardy (Blockburger)	Affirmed: no violation — offenses arose from separate acts/transactions (assaultive blows vs. later strangulation in car), so multiple punishments were permissible
Whether uncharged‑misconduct testimony (Schulman) was admissible to prove intent/motive for strangulation charge	Prior choking of another woman showed defendant knew effects of strangulation and indicated motive/intent to choke when rebuffed	Testimony was highly prejudicial, remote in time, and amounted to impermissible propensity evidence not sufficiently probative of intent here	Court erred in admitting Schulman testimony (not sufficiently connected to charged crime), but error was harmless under the Osimanti harmless‑error factors

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (establishes test whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (double jeopardy bars multiple punishments for same offense)
State v. Wright, 319 Conn. 684 (Blockburger as rebuttable presumption; legislative intent analysis)
State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93 (assessing whether convictions arise from same act/transaction by reviewing evidence)
State v. Kalil, 314 Conn. 529 (standards for admitting uncharged misconduct evidence)
State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1 (harmless‑error standards for nonconstitutional evidentiary errors)