State v. U.S. Dep't of Justice
343 F. Supp. 3d 213
S.D. Ill.2018Background
- Byrne JAG is a formula grant program (34 U.S.C. §§10151–10158) funding state/local criminal-justice programs; funds are allocated by statutory formula rather than agency discretion.
- In FY2017 DOJ/Attorney General imposed three new immigration-related conditions on Byrne JAG awards: (1) Notice Condition — advance notice to DHS of scheduled releases from local custody; (2) Access Condition — federal agents access to question detainees about immigration status; (3) Compliance Condition — certification of compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1373.
- Plaintiffs (NY, CT, NJ, RI, WA, MA, VA and City of New York) challenged the new conditions under the APA, the Tenth Amendment (anticommandeering), separation of powers, and Spending Clause doctrines; they sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief.
- DOJ justified the conditions by reference to agency statutes (34 U.S.C. §10102(a)(6) and §10153(a)(5)(D)) and administrative documents (OIG audits/memos, press materials); Plaintiffs argued DOJ lacked statutory authority and that §1373 is unconstitutional as applied to states/localities.
- The court found the conditions ultra vires and arbitrary and capricious, held §1373 unconstitutional insofar as it applies to states and localities under the Tenth Amendment (anticommandeering), granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs, ordered reissuance of awards without the conditions, and enjoined enforcement of the three conditions as to the parties and their political subdivisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authority to impose conditions on Byrne JAG | DOJ lacks statutory authority to add these conditions to a formula grant | DOJ relies on 34 U.S.C. §10102(a)(6) (catch‑all) and §10153(a)(5)(D) (applicable federal laws) | Conditions are ultra vires; §10102(a)(6) does not authorize such broad conditions and §10153(a)(5)(D) does not encompass §1373 as an applicable grant law |
| Meaning of “applicable Federal laws” in §10153 | Means laws tied to the grant/award process, not all federal laws affecting a state | Means any federal law applicable to the state/local applicant, so §1373 is covered | Court adopts narrow reading: “applicable Federal laws” = laws applicable to the grant; §1373 is not an applicable grant law |
| Constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. §1373 as applied to states/localities | §1373 commandeers state/local governments in violation of the Tenth Amendment | §1373 is preemption or regulates information and thus permissible; it facilitates information-sharing | §1373 is facially unconstitutional as applied to states/localities under the anticommandeering doctrine (Murphy controls); it does not validly preempt and is not a regulation of private actors |
| APA arbitrary-and-capricious & separation-of-powers | DOJ failed to consider harms (community trust, public safety) and lacked delegated spending authority; action arbitrary and violates separation of powers | Agency relied on OIG reports and internal memoranda to justify conditions; program is a Spending Clause vehicle | Agency action was arbitrary and capricious for ignoring important harms and ran afoul of separation of powers because the Executive lacked authority to attach these conditions to a nondiscretionary formula grant |
Key Cases Cited
- Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (anticommandeering doctrine reaffirmed; federal law cannot command state legislatures)
- City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018) (review of Byrne JAG conditions; relevant precedent on statutory authority and §1373)
- City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999) (earlier Second Circuit treatment of §1373 pre‑Murphy)
- City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (permanent injunction against Byrne JAG conditions; analysis of §1373)
- Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975) (limits on Executive altering statutory allocation of funds)
- Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (spending-power limits and voluntariness principles)
- South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (Spending Clause conditions limits)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary-and-capricious standard under the APA)