State v. Tyrus Lee Cooper
929 N.W.2d 192
Wis.2019Background
- Cooper was charged with armed robbery and, after replacing prior counsel, was represented by State Public Defender attorney Michael Hicks.
- Cooper sent multiple letters to counsel and the court alleging Hicks failed to communicate, withheld discovery, and did not subpoena witnesses; Hicks' license was temporarily suspended for part of the representation.
- On October 21, 2013 Cooper pled guilty pursuant to a recommended 3-year initial confinement / 3-year extended supervision deal; at the plea colloquy he affirmed the plea was knowing and voluntary and asked the court to take no action on his prior complaints.
- Weeks before sentencing Cooper (with new counsel) moved to withdraw his plea, citing ineffective assistance, lack of communication, undisclosed suspension, haste, and confusion; the circuit court denied the motion and later sentenced him to 5 years + 5 years extended supervision.
- Two years later this Court disciplined Hicks in a separate OLR proceeding, adopting referee factual findings (from the complaint) that Hicks failed to communicate, failed to provide discovery, and failed to notify Cooper/court of his suspension; the referee concluded these failures prevented Cooper from adequately understanding and participating in his defense.
- Cooper argued Hicks and this Court’s disciplinary opinion established ineffective assistance and therefore provided a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea; the Supreme Court reviewed whether Hicks controlled the plea-withdrawal analysis and whether Cooper proved prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Cooper's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hicks’ professional misconduct established ineffective assistance of counsel and thus a "fair and just" reason to withdraw a pre‑sentencing plea | Hicks’ discipline (and the referee’s conclusion that Cooper was prevented from participating in his defense) proves counsel was deficient and Cooper should be allowed to withdraw | The disciplinary finding addressed rule violations, not Strickland prejudice; the plea record already contained Cooper’s complaints and shows no substantial likelihood he would have gone to trial | Court held Hicks and its disciplinary opinion did not establish ineffective assistance for plea‑withdrawal purposes; Cooper failed to show prejudice |
| Whether the circuit court was bound by this Court’s findings in Hicks when deciding the plea‑withdrawal motion | Cooper: Hicks’ findings (including that he was prevented from participating) should be binding or dispositive in the criminal case | State: Hicks addressed professional‑conduct rules, not the Strickland standard; the disciplinary conclusion was not part of the criminal record before the circuit court | Court held the Supreme Court did not adopt the referee’s asserted legal conclusion as a factual or controlling finding in Cooper’s criminal proceeding |
| Whether the circuit court erroneously exercised discretion by denying the motion without an adequate evidentiary record of prejudice to the State | Cooper: circuit court ignored facts (later adopted in Hicks) showing counsel was unprepared, so it erred and should have allowed withdrawal or held an evidentiary hearing | State: the circuit court considered the facts available at the time (including Cooper’s letters and testimony) and permissibly found Cooper offered at best a conceivable, not substantial, likelihood he would have refused the plea and insisted on trial | Court held no erroneous exercise of discretion; Cooper did not show a substantial probability he would have chosen trial |
| Standard for prejudice when plea arises from ineffective assistance pre‑sentencing | Cooper/dissent: pre‑sentencing plea‑withdrawal requires only a fair and just reason; prejudice need not be shown as in post‑sentencing Strickland/Hill analysis | Majority: Hill/Strickland prejudice requirement applies to ineffective‑assistance claims tied to pleas; Cooper must show reasonable probability he would have gone to trial | Court applied Hill/Strickland and held Cooper failed to show prejudice under that standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two‑part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (applying Strickland to guilty‑plea context)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (clarifying "substantial" v. "conceivable" likelihood standard)
- Canedy v. State, 161 Wis. 2d 565 (pre‑sentence withdrawal allowed for any fair and just reason)
- Bollig v. State, 232 Wis. 2d 561 (State must show substantial prejudice to defeat pre‑sentence plea withdrawal)
- In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hicks, 368 Wis. 2d 108 (Supreme Court disciplinary decision finding Hicks committed professional misconduct; factual findings adopted from complaint/referee)