State v. Towns
307 Ga. 351
Ga.2019Background
- Ronnie Adrian Towns was indicted by a Telfair County grand jury for murder and armed robbery; the grand jury was empaneled March 16, 2015.
- Fewer than 16 summoned grand jurors appeared on time; the presiding judge ordered the clerk to supplement the grand jury by choosing from persons summoned as petit (trial) jurors under OCGA § 15-12-66.1.
- The clerk selected two petit jurors (T.S. and B.W.) she personally knew or could contact quickly; 22 jurors (including T.S. and B.W.) heard evidence and returned a true bill the same day.
- Towns moved to dismiss, arguing T.S. and B.W. were not chosen "at random"; after an evidentiary hearing the trial court found the clerk’s selection destroyed randomness and dismissed the indictment.
- The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed: OCGA § 15-12-66.1 requires that supplemental petit jurors be chosen by a process producing substantially unpredictable choices; the clerk’s reliance on personal knowledge/contactability was nonrandom and violated an "essential and substantial" statutory requirement, warranting dismissal.
- A dissenting opinion argued the supplemental selection procedure is a minor, directory adjunct to the statutory scheme, that the clerk substantially complied in good faith, and that dismissal was an unduly extreme remedy; the majority declined to adopt that view.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Towns) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether choosing petit jurors to supplement a grand jury must be done "at random" under OCGA § 15-12-66.1 | Selection was lawful because the petit list was randomly generated and the clerk’s contact choices did not defeat randomness | Clerk purposefully selected individuals she knew/could contact, destroying randomness | Selection of T.S. and B.W. was not "at random"; statute requires a process producing substantially unpredictable choices; reversal denied (selection invalid) |
| Whether the nonrandom selection violated an "essential and substantial" statutory provision requiring dismissal of the indictment | Supplemental-selection randomness is a limited/directory requirement; quashing indictment is disproportionate | Randomness is a core pillar of jury-selection scheme; any violation affecting identity of chosen persons is essential and warrants dismissal | The randomness requirement is "essential and substantial"; dismissal of the indictment was appropriate |
| Whether the State may obtain appellate review of the trial court’s rejection of Towns’s alternative challenge to master jury list inclusivity | State sought review of trial court’s rejection of Towns’ inclusivity claim | Towns did not seek review of that rejection | Court declined to review the inclusivity rejection at State’s behest because State was not aggrieved by that ruling |
| Whether dismissal is an excessive remedy given good-faith, limited nonrandom selection | Dismissal is extreme; clerk acted in good faith and substantial compliance; delay and burden to State outweigh remedy | Remedy necessary to vindicate statutory randomness and protect jury-selection integrity | Court affirmed dismissal despite lack of nefarious intent; statutory violation remedied by quashing indictment |
Key Cases Cited
- Pollard v. State, 148 Ga. 447 (1918) (establishes longstanding "essential and substantial" test for jury-selection statutes)
- Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102 (2008) (dismissal warranted where improper juror service undermined array)
- Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 240 (2014) (discussion of grand-jury function and differences from petit juries)
- Turner v. State, 78 Ga. 174 (1886) (early authority on irregularities in grand-jury composition and relief)
- Boon v. State, 1 Ga. 631 (1846) (historical support for relief when selection procedures are improper)
- United States v. Kotrlik, 465 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1972) (illustrative discussion of colloquial meaning of "random")
- Smirnov v. Clinton, 806 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011) (statutory "random" construed to mean equal or unpredictable chances)