State v. Tinsley, 197 Conn.App. 302

Victim: a 15-month-old child who died after blunt-force trauma; autopsy showed fresh cranial hemorrhages, a lacerated liver (cause of death), fractured rib, and multiple fresh contusions and abrasions. Medical witnesses testified injuries were inflicted within minutes of one another and shortly before death.
Charges: long-form information charged capital felony (reduced in verdict to manslaughter in the first degree) and risk of injury to a child, both alleged to have occurred "on or about the morning of December 8, 1996" at the same location and against the same victim.
Jury verdict: convicted of manslaughter in the first degree (lesser included of capital felony) and risk of injury to a child; trial court imposed consecutive sentences (20 years + 10 years).
Procedural history: defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence on double jeopardy grounds; trial court denied relief concluding the offenses might have arisen from separable acts and that risk of injury was not a lesser included offense as charged.
Appellate disposition: Connecticut Appellate Court reviewed de novo the double jeopardy claim, considered the information, trial evidence, and the state’s theory, and reversed—holding double jeopardy was violated and remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Tinsley)	Held
Did the manslaughter and risk-of-injury charges arise from the same act/transaction?	Injuries could be temporally separable; distinct acts could support separate offenses.	Medical testimony and prosecutor’s theory showed all injuries were recent and inflicted within minutes in one continuous attack.	Yes. Information, medical testimony, and prosecutor’s theory showed the injuries occurred in the same short period; same transaction satisfied.
Was risk of injury to a child a lesser included offense of manslaughter as charged?	Risk-of-injury can be based on non-fatal blows (so theoretically separable from the fatal abdominal trauma).	It was impossible to cause death by blunt abdominal trauma (as charged) without also impairing the child’s health—so risk of injury is necessarily included.	Yes. Under the charging documents and statutes, committing manslaughter as alleged necessarily involved the risk-of-injury offense.
Did the legislature clearly authorize cumulative punishments so double jeopardy does not apply?	(State offered no authority showing legislative intent to permit separate punishments for these overlapping offenses.)	No legislative authorization exists; Blockburger presumption against multiple punishment should control.	No legislative authorization shown; absent that, Blockburger presumption controls and cumulative sentences here violate double jeopardy.

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932) (test for whether two statutory offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes)
State v. Porter, 328 Conn. 648 (Conn. 2018) (at step one a court may consider trial evidence and the state’s theory to determine whether offenses arose from the same transaction)
State v. Bumgarner-Ramos, 187 Conn. App. 725 (Conn. App. 2019) (explains Blockburger use at step two and the lesser‑included inquiry focusing on whether the greater can be committed without the lesser)
State v. Goldson, 178 Conn. 422 (Conn. 1979) (same-transaction found where information alleged same time/place/victim)
State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93 (Conn. 2002) (lesser‑included analysis looks to statutes and charging documents, not trial evidence)
State v. Gonzalez, 302 Conn. 287 (Conn. 2011) (legislature may authorize cumulative punishment; absent clear intent, Blockburger presumption controls)
State v. Cator, 256 Conn. 785 (Conn. 2001) (trial and appellate courts have authority to correct an illegal sentence)