State v. THOMAS (And Vice Versa), 311 Ga. 407

Background

On June 22, 2013, Ashley Brown was fatally shot after a planned drug deal; Tyler Thomas was later tried, convicted of malice murder and a firearm offense, and sentenced to life plus five years.
Ricardo Thomas (co-indictee and cousin) was the State’s chief witness; his accomplice testimony placed Thomas in the car and identified conduct leading to the shooting.
Jaleesa Glenn owned the Altima Thomas used the night of the killing; at trial she testified for the State that Thomas borrowed her car and returned it damaged, corroborating parts of Ricardo’s account.
After trial, evidence emerged that Fulton County ADA Adam Abbate met with Glenn shortly before she testified and Glenn later received a nolle prosequi on a pending Carroll County felony shoplifting charge; Glenn testified at the new-trial hearing that Abbate told her she could avoid jail if she cooperated.
The trial court granted Thomas’s amended motion for new trial, holding the State violated Brady by failing to disclose its deal with Glenn; Thomas also argued on cross-appeal that accomplice testimony was insufficiently corroborated and that retrial should be barred.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the new-trial order (Brady violation and materiality) and also held the trial evidence, viewed properly for sufficiency, was corroborated enough under OCGA § 24-14-8 to permit retrial.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Thomas's Argument	Held
Brady nondisclosure of deal with witness Glenn	No enforceable promise was made; trial court erred in finding a deal	State promised to help Glenn resolve her felony charge in exchange for testimony; nondisclosure violated due process	Trial court’s finding of a deal was not clearly erroneous; Brady violation established; new trial affirmed
Whether defense could have discovered the deal with reasonable diligence	Defense could/should have learned of any deal by questioning Glenn or using available records	Defense had no notice and Glenn became unresponsive; counsel need not cross-examine every witness about possible deals	Reasonable diligence does not require probing every witness; Brady suppression element satisfied
Materiality of suppressed impeachment evidence	Disclosure would not likely have changed outcome given other corroboration	The undisclosed deal was highly impeaching of Glenn and, combined with weaknesses in Ricardo’s testimony, could have changed the verdict	Suppressed evidence was material under Kyles/Giglio; undermined confidence in verdict; new trial warranted
Sufficiency/corroboration of accomplice testimony (OCGA § 24-14-8) and double jeopardy bar to retrial	Evidence (Glenn’s testimony, phone records, cell-site, witness testimony, flight) provided slight corroboration sufficient for conviction and retrial	Ricardo’s testimony lacked adequate independent corroboration; conviction should be overturned and retrial barred	Viewing the record most favorably to the verdict, corroboration (including Glenn’s properly admitted testimony) was slight but sufficient; convictions stand for purposes of retrial (double jeopardy not triggered)

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose favorable evidence material to guilt or punishment)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence and witness deals must be disclosed)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality test: suppressed evidence that undermines confidence in trial outcome)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (federal due-process sufficiency standard viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
Gonnella v. State, 286 Ga. 211 (2009) (Georgia duty to disclose any agreement with witness)
Raines v. State, 304 Ga. 582 (2018) (accomplice testimony requires only slight corroboration, which may be circumstantial)
Cowart v. State, 294 Ga. 333 (2013) (sufficiency review considers all evidence admitted at trial, even if later held erroneous)