133 So. 3d 1133
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Statute 831.28(2)(a) makes it unlawful to counterfeit a payment instrument with intent to defraud or to possess any counterfeit payment instrument.
- Thomas was arrested on Aug. 24, 2011, with 35 checks bearing others’ names, blank check stock, a printer, and unrelated Florida ID; he faced eight counterfeiting-related charges.
- The trial court held the possession-oriented clause of 831.28(2)(a) unconstitutional as a facially strict-liability provision.
- State argues the Legislature intended to prohibit possession of counterfeit instruments only when coupled with intent to defraud; reading the statute this way preserves constitutionality.
- The court applied the Bradford/Saiez framework, concluding the mere possession provision is facially unconstitutional because it criminalizes innocent conduct.
- The appellate court affirmed, holding the possession provision unconstitutional and leaving intact any constitutionally sound aspects of the statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether possession of a counterfeit payment instrument is constitutional | Thomas argues the possession provision is facially unconstitutional due to strict liability. | State contends the statute should be read to require intent to defraud, preserving constitutionality. | The possession provision is unconstitutional. |
| Whether the statute can be construed to avoid unconstitutionality | Thomas contends the court should construe the statute to preserve constitutionality. | State argues plain language controls; cannot rearrange words to fix defects. | The court did not read in a allowable construction; maintained unconstitutionality. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bradford v. State, 787 So.2d 811 (Fla. 2001) (statutory language facially clear; no intent to defraud required in that context)
- Saiez v. State, 489 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 1986) (criminalization of embossing machines unconstitutional where not tied to wrongdoing)
- State v. Dugan, 685 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 1996) (statutory interpretation relies on natural meaning of language)
- Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1995) (linguistic and grammatical construction governs interpretation)
- Bodden v. State, 877 So.2d 680 (Fla. 2004) (limits on reading statutes to infer legislative intent when language is clear)
- Giorgetti v. State, 868 So.2d 512 (Fla. 2004) (mens rea generally read into criminal statutes unless clearly not required)