State v. Thacker, 2024 Ohio 5835

Background

In 2010, 16‑year‑old Tony Thacker was adjudicated delinquent for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would have been a felony involving drug trafficking (apparently marijuana).
Ohio law, R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), bars possession of any firearm by a person previously adjudicated delinquent for felony drug offenses; relief from the disability requires court action under R.C. 2923.14.
In 2023, age 29, Thacker was indicted for possessing a firearm while under that disability; he moved to dismiss, arguing R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) is unconstitutional as applied under the Second Amendment.
The trial court dismissed the weapons counts; the State appealed. The appellate court reviewed de novo and applied the Bruen/Rahimi history‑and‑tradition framework.
The court held the statute unconstitutional as applied to Thacker: permanently disarming a nonviolent juvenile delinquent now an adult, based solely on the juvenile adjudication and subject only to discretionary relief, lacks a relevant founding‑era analogue and conflicts with juvenile‑justice principles of rehabilitation and the absence of a jury.
Judgment: counts charging weapons‑under‑a‑disability (counts eight and nine) dismissed; State’s appeal overruled.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether R.C. 2923.13(A)(3) as applied to Thacker violates the Second Amendment	The statute validly disarms those with qualifying juvenile adjudications as a legislative judgment about dangerousness; longstanding tradition permits disarming felons and juveniles	The Second Amendment protects Thacker’s right to bear arms; lifelong disability based solely on a nonviolent juvenile adjudication lacks historical analogue	Statute unconstitutional as applied: Second Amendment protects the conduct and State failed to show a relevant historical tradition justifying life‑long disarmament here
Whether juvenile delinquency adjudication is equivalent to an adult felony for Second Amendment purposes	Juvenile adjudications may be used as a proxy for dangerousness and thus support a firearms disability	Juvenile adjudications differ materially from adult felony convictions (no jury, rehabilitative focus); not relevantly similar to founding‑era felonies	Juvenile adjudications are not equivalent to founding‑era felony convictions and cannot alone sustain presumptively permanent disarmament
Whether a legislative categorical ban on (nonviolent) juvenile drug offenders can presume permanent dangerousness	Legislature may classify groups as dangerous and provide for disabilities; relief statute R.C. 2923.14 makes disability temporary in practice	A lifetime presumption of continued dangerousness conflicts with juvenile system’s rehabilitative presumption; R.C. 2923.14 is discretionary and indeterminate	A presumptively permanent disability for nonviolent juvenile drug adjudications is not historically analogous and is unconstitutional unless the disability is reasonably limited or restored as‑of‑right
Whether historical analogues (surety, going‑armed, felon bans) sustain the statute	History shows disarmament of dangerous people and some categorical bans (felons, mentally ill); analogies suffice to uphold modern legislative judgments	Surety/going‑armed regimes were limited, individualized, or tied to enduring characteristics; founding‑era felon disarmament presupposed jury trial and different penalties	The State’s analogies fail to justify permanent disarmament here; duration and lack of individualized, objective restoration process are decisive

Key Cases Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognizes an individual right to possess arms and notes longstanding presumptively lawful prohibitions)
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (adopts history‑and‑tradition test for Second Amendment challenges)
United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024) (upholds temporary disarmament of individuals found to pose a threat; identifies surety and going‑armed laws as historical analogues)
United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024) (provides framework for as‑applied challenges to categorical felon bans and emphasizes need for individualized opportunity to rebut dangerousness presumption)
Range v. Attorney General of U.S., 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. en banc 2023) (en banc view that as‑applied challenges to felon‑in‑possession statutes can succeed when historical analogues are lacking)
United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024) (upheld categorical felony ban relying on historical practice of disarming classes viewed as dangerous)
United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) (upheld application of felon‑in‑possession statute to defendant whose predicate offense aligned with founding‑era felony analogues)
Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019) (dissent/excerpt cited for proposition that legislatures may disarm dangerous people but only those who are dangerous)
Dubois v. United States, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) (represents a line of circuit opinions upholding categorical felon bans post‑Bruen)