Case Information
*2 Before W ILLIAM P RYOR , Chief Judge, and R OSENBAUM and A BUDU , Circuit Judges.
W ILLIAM P RYOR , Chief Judge:
This appeal by Andre Dubois, a federal prisoner, of his con- victions and sentence for three federal firearm offenses requires us to answer five questions. First, did New York State Rif le & Pistol As- sociation v. Bruen , 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), which held that the Second Amendment protects a right to bear arms outside the home, abro- gate our precedent upholding the felon-in-possession ban? See U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); United States v. Rozier , 598 F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010). Second, was there sufficient evidence from which a rea- sonable jury could find that Dubois knew that he possessed a fire- arm? Third, is Dubois’s Georgia marijuana conviction a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines? See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) (Nov 2021). Fourth, does our precedent interpreting the guidelines’ stolen-gun enhancement, see id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), violate due process or inter- vening Supreme Court precedent? And fifth, did the district court plainly err by sentencing Dubois to pay a $25,000 fine without ex- planation? Because our precedent forecloses Dubois’s challenges to the felon-in-possession statute and the stolen-gun enhancement; the evidence could permit a reasonable jury to convict him on all counts; his marijuana conviction is a controlled substance offense; and unchallenged evidence proves that he can afford his fine, we affirm Dubois’s convictions and sentence. Opinion of the Court 3
I. BACKGROUND In 2018, Andre Dubois entered an Express Copy Print & Ship store in Suwanee, Georgia, and attempted to ship a box containing firearms to the Commonwealth of Dominica. Federal officials seized the shipment and charged Dubois with three counts: at- tempting to smuggle firearms out of the United States, see U.S.C. § 554; delivering firearms to a common carrier for shipment without written notice, see id. § 922(e); and possessing a firearm as a felon, see id. § 922(g)(1). The only factual dispute at trial was whether Dubois knew that the box he tried to ship contained fire- arms—an element of all three charges. Dubois stipulated that he was the customer who delivered the package and that he knew that he was a felon when he did so.
At trial, the prosecution presented evidence that on April 23, 2018, a car parked outside the ship store. Dubois exited the passen- ger side and walked into the store carrying a large, sealed box on his shoulder. Jeffrey Morris was working the front desk. Morris asked Dubois to state his name, phone number, and return address; the recipient’s name, phone number, and shipping address; and the contents of the package. Dubois said that his name was “Larry Da- vis” and provided a Georgia return address and New York phone number. He said that the recipient’s name was “Monette Paul” and provided a Dominica shipping address and phone number. And he said that the package contained two frying pans.
Dubois behaved strangely during the transaction. Dubois read some of the information that he gave Morris from a piece of Opinion of the Court paper that he had pulled from his pocket. And he made or took three phone calls during his brief exchange with Morris to “double check” the information he provided. When Morris tried to verify the return address using the store’s online database, it came back as an “unknown” address. Because this notification sometimes ap- peared for new addresses not yet programmed in the database, Morris asked Dubois whether his address was new. Dubois replied, “it’s a newer address.” Morris testified that he asked Dubois twice whether the information that he provided was accurate, and both times Dubois said that it was. Morris also specifically asked Dubois whether, “if [he] opened the box, there would be two frying pans in it.” Dubois replied, “yes.” And on the customer invoice—which Dubois signed “Larry Davis”—Dubois certified that his shipment complied with federal law, that the information he provided was “true and correct,” and that “the contents of th[e] shipment [we]re as stated” on the invoice. Dubois paid for the shipment in cash be- fore exiting the store.
Federal officials seized the package after a carrier employee identified a suspicious object during an x-ray screen. Officials dis- covered a loaded revolver, two disassembled pistols, and over 400 bullets, all wrapped in aluminum foil and hidden in two individu- ally packaged deep fryers. According to an investigator, firearm smugglers often try to evade detection by packaging firearms in this manner.
An investigation into the shipper’s identity revealed that the information Dubois gave Morris was false. Agents began their Opinion of the Court investigation by looking for “Larry Davis,” the listed sender, but they could not find anyone with that name associated with the listed address or phone number. Nor could agents locate “Monette Paul,” the listed recipient. Finally, using the ship store’s surveillance footage, agents identified Dubois as the shipper by tracing the logo on the shipper’s sweatshirt to Dubois’s former employer. An agent testified that “every shipper” he has encountered “who has at- tempted or successfully made an illegal export from the United States . . . provided false information on the shipping documents.”
At the close of the prosecution’s case, Dubois moved for ac- quittal on all counts. See F ED . R. C RIM . P. 29(a). He argued that all three counts failed as a matter of law because the prosecution failed to introduce sufficient evidence that Dubois knew that the package that he attempted to ship contained firearms. And he argued that his section 922(g)(1) charge was unconstitutional because nonvio- lent felons maintain a Second Amendment right to possess fire- arms—though he acknowledged that “existing precedent” fore- closed this argument. The district court denied Dubois’s motion, and the jury convicted him on all counts.
A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation re- port recommending an imprisonment range of 130 to 162 months and a fine range of $25,000 to $250,000 under the Sentencing Guidelines. The officer assigned Dubois a base offense level of 20 after concluding that Dubois’s 2013 Georgia conviction for posses- sion with intent to distribute marijuana was a “controlled sub- stance offense.” See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), 4B1.2(b). And the Opinion of the Court officer applied a two-level enhancement because one of the fire- arms that Dubois possessed had been reported as stolen. See id. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A).
The presentence investigation report also described Du- bois’s “[f ]inancial [c]ondition” and his “[a]bility to [p]ay” a fine. The report stated that the probation officer had requested “signed au- thorization forms and financial documents” from Dubois, but Du- bois never provided this information. So the probation officer ob- tained Dubois’s financial information by consulting public records, Dubois’s bond report, and Dubois’s pretrial services record. The officer calculated Dubois’s net worth as exceeding $54,000 by sub- tracting his student loan debt and unpaid court fines from the value of a condo that he had inherited from his mother. And the officer found that Dubois had a monthly income exceeding $3,000. Last, the probation officer determined that Dubois was “able-bodied and could work while in custody to make minimal payments towards any fine the Court orders.” Based on this information, the officer concluded that Dubois “ha[d] the ability to pay a fine within the fine guideline range” of $25,000 to $250,000.
Dubois objected to three parts of the presentence investiga- tion report. First, he objected to the description of his offense con- duct on the ground that “he is not guilty of the offense charged” because “the government did not prove that he knew what was in the box.” Second, Dubois objected to the probation officer’s appli- cation of an enhanced base offense level of 20 because his Georgia marijuana conviction does not qualify as a categorical controlled Opinion of the Court substance offense under the guidelines. Last, he objected to the sto- len-gun enhancement on the ground that applying it “on a strict liability basis” violates due process and that its accompanying com- mentary “impermissibly expands” the guideline beyond its plain text. Dubois did not object to the probation officer’s recommended fine range or to the finding that Dubois could afford a fine within that range. And aside from the description of his offense conduct, Dubois did not object to any of the factual findings in the report.
The district court overruled Dubois’s objections and, on March 1, 2022, sentenced Dubois to a below-guideline prison sen- tence of 110 months and a low-end fine of $25,000. It did not pro- vide reasoning for the fine amount during the sentencing hearing, but Dubois’s counsel made no specific objection to the amount or to Dubois’s ability to pay it. His counsel made only a general objec- tion: “I’ll object to the sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable and also object to the substantive reasonableness spe- cifically of both the sentence and the fine.”
Dubois appealed his convictions and sentence. While his ap- peal was pending, but before the parties filed their briefs, the Su- preme Court decided in Bruen that “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Dubois later moved to stay his appeal pending two decisions. See United States v. Rahimi , No. 22-915 (U.S. argued Nov. 7, 2023); Jackson v. United States , No. 22-6640 (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2023). We denied his mo- tion to stay and his motion for reconsideration. Opinion of the Court
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi- dence, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov- ernment and resolving all reasonable inferences and credibility de- terminations in the government’s favor.” United States v. Green , 981 F.3d 945, 960 (11th Cir. 2020). We will affirm the jury’s verdict so long as “any reasonable construction of the evidence could have allowed the jury to find ‘the essential elements of the crime’ be- yond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Colston , 4 F.4th 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We also review de novo the interpretation and constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Amedeo , 370 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) (interpretation); United States v. Matchett , 802 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2015) (constitutionality). And we review de novo the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal. United States v. Seher , 562 F.3d 1344, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). We review for plain error an unpreserved challenge to a criminal fine. See United States v. Hernandez , 160 F.3d 661, 665 (11th Cir. 1998).
III. DISCUSSION We proceed in five parts. First, we explain that our precedent forecloses Dubois’s argument that section 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. Second, we explain that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Dubois knew that he possessed a firearm. Third, we explain that Dubois’s state marijuana conviction is a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guide- lines. Fourth, we explain that the application of the stolen-gun Opinion of the Court enhancement on a strict-liability basis complies with due process and Supreme Court precedent. Fifth, we explain that the imposi- tion of a $25,000 fine was not plain error.
A. Our Precedent Bars Dubois’s Second Amendment Challenge. Dubois challenges the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the felon-in-possession charge. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dubois does not dispute that his conduct falls squarely within the federal offense: he possessed firearms and ammunition after sustaining a felony conviction for drug trafficking. He instead argues that the statute violates his right to bear arms under the Sec- ond Amendment. Dubois concedes that Circuit precedent bars his challenge; we upheld section 922(g)(1) under the Second Amend- ment in Rozier , 598 F.3d at 770–71. But Dubois argues that Bruen abrogated Rozier and requires us to vacate his conviction. We disa- gree.
In District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), the Supreme Court sustained a Second Amendment challenge to a Dis- trict of Columbia law that prohibited private possession of hand- guns. The Court adopted an approach “bas[ed] o[n] both text and history” for analyzing gun restrictions and ruled the prohibition un- constitutional. Id. at 595. It held that law-abiding citizens have a Second Amendment right to possess handguns in the home for self- defense. Id. at 635–36.
Heller cautioned that the Second Amendment right “is not unlimited.” Id. at 626. Importantly, the Court stated that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding Opinion of the Court prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the men- tally ill.” Id. The Court labeled these federal regulations “presump- tively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26. And it explained that the Second Amendment guarantees a right to “law-abiding, responsible citi- zens” who “use arms in defense of hearth and home.” See id. at 635.
Two years after Heller , we rejected a challenge to sec- tion 922(g)(1) in Rozier . Like Dubois, Rozier possessed a firearm and ammunition after having been convicted of a felony drug crime. 598 F.3d at 769 & n.1. He challenged his conviction on the ground that section 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment. Id. at 770. We disagreed because, under Heller , “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” Id. at 771. “[T]he first ques- tion” under Heller , we explained, “is whether one is qualified to pos- sess a firearm.” Id. at 770. And felons are unqualified as “a class” because they are not “law-abiding citizen[s].” Id. at 771. Heller “made this clear” by labeling the felon-in-possession ban “‘a pre- sumptively lawful longstanding tradition.’” Id. (quoting United States v. White , 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010)); accord McDonald v. City of Chicago , 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (plurality opin- ion) (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill’ . . . . We re- peat those assurances here.” (quoting Heller , 554 U.S. at 626–27)). And we said that this language from Heller was “not dicta” because it limited the Second Amendment right to “ law-abiding and qualified individuals.” Rozier , 598 F.3d at 771 n.6. Opinion of the Court
After Heller and Rozier came Bruen , which involved a chal- lenge to New York’s gun-licensing regime. 142 S. Ct. at 2122. New York prohibited law-abiding citizens from obtaining a license to carry outside the home unless they first proved “a special need for self-defense.” Id. The Court ruled the scheme unconstitutional be- cause “the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individ- ual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Id.
Bruen began its analysis by rejecting, as inconsistent with Hel- ler , the second part of a two-step test that then prevailed in most circuits. See id. at 2125–30. Under that test, a court would first ask whether the challenged law burdened conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment, “as historically understood.” See, e.g. , United States v. Greeno , 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012). If it did, the court would review the regulation under either intermediate or strict scrutiny. See id. We embraced this two-part framework in dicta beginning in 2012, see GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia , 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012), but we have never actually applied the second, means-end-scrutiny step, see United States v. Jimenez-Shi- lon , 34 F.4th 1042, 1052–53 (11th Cir. 2022) (Newsom, J., concur- ring).
Bruen approved “[s]tep one of the predominant framework” as “broadly consistent with Heller , which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history.” 142 S. Ct. at 2127. But Bruen rejected the second, “means-end scrutiny” step as incompatible with Heller , which “expressly rejected” applying a Opinion of the Court “judge-empowering interest-balancing inquiry” to analyze Second Amendment challenges. Id. at 2127, 2129 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heller , 554 U.S. at 634). Bruen then reiterated that “ Heller ’s text-and-history standard” is the correct test for determin- ing the constitutionality of gun restrictions. See id. at 2138.
The Supreme Court left no doubt that it viewed its decision as a faithful application of Heller , not a departure from it. See, e.g. , id. at 2122 (stating that its holding is “consistent with Heller ”); id. at 2131 (stating that its test “[f ]ollow[s] the course charted by Heller ”); id. (stating that “[t]he test that [the Court] set forth in Heller ” is the same one that courts must “apply today”). That approval of Heller included the recognition that the Second Amendment is “subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” Id. at 2156 (citing Heller , 554 U.S. at 581). Although the Court did not mention felon- in-possession bans, it confirmed that Heller correctly “relied on the historical understanding of the Amendment to demark the limits on the exercise of that right.” Id. at 2128. And Bruen , like Heller , repeatedly described the right as extending only to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.” See, e.g. , id. at 2131 (quoting Heller , 554 U.S. at 635).
To determine whether Bruen abrogates Rozier , we apply our prior-panel-precedent rule: “‘a prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc .’” In re Lambrix , 776 F.3d 789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Archer , 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008)). Opinion of the Court An intervening Supreme Court decision abrogates our precedent only if the intervening decision is both “clearly on point” and “clearly contrary to” our earlier decision. Edwards v. U.S. Att’y Gen. , 56 F.4th 951, 965 (11th Cir. 2022) (emphasis omitted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the Supreme Court “never discussed” our precedent and did not “otherwise comment[] on” the precise issue before the prior panel, our precedent remains binding. See United States v. Vega-Castillo , 540 F.3d 1235, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2008). To abrogate a prior-panel precedent, “the later Su- preme Court decision must ‘demolish’ and ‘eviscerate’ each of its ‘fundamental props.’” Del Castillo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Health , 26 F.4th 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2022) (alterations adopted) (citation omitted), cert. denied , Del Castillo v. Ladapo , 143 S. Ct. 486 (2022). So, for example, if our precedent relied on “a line of Supreme Court precedents that the [Supreme] Court itself emphasizes in a later decision is not implicated by that later decision,” the Supreme Court’s intervening decision “cannot have” abrogated our prece- dent. Id.
Bruen did not abrogate Rozier . Because the Supreme Court “made it clear in Heller that [its] holding did not cast doubt” on felon-in-possession prohibitions, McDonald , 561 U.S. at 786 (plural- ity opinion), and because the Court made it clear in Bruen that its holding was “[i]n keeping with Heller ,” 142 S. Ct. at 2126, Bruen could not have clearly abrogated our precedent upholding sec- tion 922(g)(1). See Del Castillo , 26 F.4th at 1223–25. Indeed, the Bruen majority did not mention felons or section 922(g)(1). See Vega-Cas- tillo , 540 F.3d at 1238–39. Opinion of the Court
Dubois argues that we may depart from Rozier because Bruen abrogated “[a]ll prior precedent relying on the two-step anal- ysis.” But Rozier upheld section 922(g)(1) on the threshold ground that felons are categorically “disqualified” from exercising their Second Amendment right under Heller . Rozier , 598 F.3d at 770–71 (quoting Heller , 554 U.S. at 635). We interpreted Heller as limiting the right to “law-abiding and qualified individuals” and as clearly excluding felons from those categories by referring to felon-in-pos- session bans as presumptively lawful. Rozier , 598 F.3d at 771 & n.6. And far from “demolish[ing]” or “eviscerat[ing]” Rozier ’s reliance on Heller , see Del Castillo , 26 F.4th at 1224, Bruen repeatedly stated that its decision was faithful to Heller . We require clearer instruc- tion from the Supreme Court before we may reconsider the con- stitutionality of section 922(g)(1). Because Rozier binds us, Dubois’s challenge based on the Second Amendment necessarily fails.
B. Sufficient Evidence Supported the Verdict. Dubois also argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal on all counts because there was insufficient evidence that he knew that the box he attempted to ship contained a firearm. We disagree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Dubois knew that the box contained firearms. See Colston , 4 F.4th at 1189–90.
Although there is no direct evidence that Dubois knew that the box contained firearms, the prosecution may and often does prove knowledge using circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1190 (“Guilty Opinion of the Court knowledge can rarely be established directly.”). And there is ample circumstantial evidence that allowed a reasonable jury to find that Dubois knew that firearms were in the box. For example, there is substantial evidence that Dubois tried to make the illicit shipment untraceable to either himself or the intended recipient—efforts that would be inexplicable if Dubois did not know that the box con- tained illegal contraband. In particular, the jury heard that Dubois gave Morris fake names, addresses, and phone numbers for both himself and the recipient; that Dubois falsely certified that this in- formation was accurate; and that he paid for the transaction in cash. See United States v. Myers , 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that “concealment, assumption of a false name, and related conduct[]” may be evidence of guilt (citation omitted)). The parties also stipulated at trial that Dubois knew that he was a felon when he possessed the box. Dubois’s felon status provides a plausible mo- tivation for his lying about the shipment and supports an inference that he knew the box contained firearms or ammunition as op- posed to some other contraband. Dubois also knew some of the contents of the package: he told Morris that the box contained “two frying pans,” and the box in fact contained “two deep fryers” in addition to the firearms and ammunition. That Dubois knew some of the contents of the box supports an inference that he knew the remaining contents as well. And by delivering the box to the ship store, Dubois “was instrumental to [the] . . . success” of the criminal plan—another circumstantial “guidepost[]” by which we have said a jury may infer knowledge. Colston , 4 F.4th at 1190. Opinion of the Court
We accept Dubois’s argument that the evidence also sup- ports an inference that he was being directed by someone else to mail the package: someone else drove Dubois to the ship store; Du- bois read some of the shipping information that he relayed to Mor- ris from a piece of paper; and Dubois made or took three phone calls during the brief transaction to confirm that information. But that inference is consistent with the inference that Dubois too knew the package contained a gun. See id. (“[I]f a defendant . . . was in frequent contact with someone who knew th[e critical] fact, then a jury may be able to infer knowledge.”). This “reasonable construc- tion of the evidence” allowed the jury to find that the prosecution proved Dubois’s knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
C. Dubois’s Georgia Marijuana Conviction is a “Controlled Substance
Offense” Under the Sentencing Guidelines. Next, Dubois argues that we should vacate his sentence be- cause his 2013 conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana is not a predicate “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Although Dubois’s base offense level for his firearm convictions would ordinarily be 14, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6), the guidelines assign a base offense level of 20 if the defendant “committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining” a felony conviction for a “crime of violence or a con- trolled substance offense,” id. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The guidelines de- fine a “controlled substance offense” as “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or Opinion of the Court dispense.” Id. § 4B1.2(b); see id. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.1 (“‘Controlled sub- stance offense’ has the meaning given that term in [sec- tion] 4B1.2(b).”). The district court enhanced Dubois’s base offense level under the guidelines based on his 2013 Georgia conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. See G A . C ODE § 16- 13-30(j)(1) (2013).
To determine whether a state conviction qualifies as a con- trolled substance offense under the guidelines, we apply the “cate- gorical approach.” Hollis v. United States , 958 F.3d 1120, 1123 (11th Cir. 2020). This approach requires us to compare the guideline def- inition of “controlled substance offense” with the state statute of conviction. United States v. Lange , 862 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Dupree , 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Unless “the least culpable conduct prohibited under the state law . . . qualif[ies] as a predicate [con- trolled substance] offense,” the defendant’s state conviction cannot be the basis of an enhancement under the guidelines, regardless of the actual conduct underlying the conviction. See United States v. Laines , 69 F.4th 1221, 1233 (11th Cir. 2023).
Dubois argues that his Georgia conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana does not qualify him for base- level enhancement because his statute of conviction is categorically broader than the guideline definition of “controlled substance of- fense.” He explains that at the time of his conviction in 2013, both Georgia and federal law defined “marijuana” to include hemp. See G A . C ODE § 16-13-21(16) (2011); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2009). But by Opinion of the Court the time he was sentenced for his federal offenses in 2022, both def- initions had been amended to exclude hemp. See G A . C ODE § 16-13- 21(16) (2019); 21 U.S.C. § 802(16)(B)(i) (2018). Because the law at the time of his state conviction was broader than the law at the time of his federal sentencing, he maintains that the state convic- tion is not a controlled substance offense.
Our precedent does not resolve Dubois’s challenge. The government relies on our decision in United States v. Bates , 960 F.3d 1278, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020), which held that “Bates’s prior Georgia convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute qualified as predicate [controlled substance] offenses . . . [under] the Guidelines.” But there was no intervening-change-of-law prob- lem in Bates . Even though Bates was decided after the amendments excluding hemp from the Georgia and federal definitions of mari- juana were passed, Bates was convicted of the Georgia marijuana offense and sentenced for the federal firearm offense before those amendments were passed. See Brief of Appellant at 1, 10, United States v. Bates , 960 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-12533), 2018 WL 4858856, at *1, *10.
We must decide whether marijuana is a “controlled sub- stance” under the guideline definition of “controlled substance of- fense,” see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), and that question comprises two sub-questions that have divided our sister circuits. First, when the predicate offense is a state crime, is the meaning of “controlled sub- stance” nonetheless limited to drugs regulated by the federal Con- trolled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802, or is it instead defined by Opinion of the Court the state’s drug schedules? Second, is “controlled substance” de- fined by reference to the relevant drug schedules in effect at the time of the defendant’s prior state conviction or those in effect at the time of his federal sentencing for the instant firearm offense?
1. For a Prior State Conviction, a “Controlled Substance” is a Substance Regulated by State Law.
The first sub-question is whether “controlled substance” is defined by reference to federal or state drug schedules. Most cir- cuits that have addressed it have held that, for prior state convic- tions, a “controlled substance” is one regulated by state law, even if it is not also regulated by federal law. See United States v. Lewis , 58 F.4th 764, 768–69 (3d Cir. 2023); United States v. Ward , 972 F.3d 364, 372 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jones , 81 F.4th 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Ruth , 966 F.3d 642, 654 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Henderson , 11 F.4th 713, 718 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. Jones , 15 F.4th 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 2021). But two circuits have held that the meaning of “controlled substance” is limited to drugs reg- ulated by the federal Controlled Substances Act, even for state-law convictions. See United States v. Townsend , 897 F.3d 66, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Bautista , 989 F.3d 698, 702 (9th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Crocco , 15 F.4th 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2021) (describing, in dicta, this federal-law-only approach as “appealing” and the ma- jority approach as “fraught with peril”); United States v. Gomez-Al- varez , 781 F.3d 787, 793–94 (5th Cir. 2015) (adopting a federal-law- Opinion of the Court only approach to define “controlled substance” under sec- tion 2L1.2(b)(A)(i) of the Sentencing Guidelines).
We adopt the majority approach. A drug regulated by state law is a “controlled substance” for state predicate offenses, even if federal law does not regulate that drug. More precisely, state law defines which drugs qualify as a “controlled substance” if the prior conviction was under state law, and federal law defines which drugs qualify as a “controlled substance” if the prior conviction was un- der federal law. This approach is compelled by the text of the guide- lines and our precedent.
We begin with the text. “When interpreting the guidelines, we apply the traditional rules of statutory construction.” United States v. Stines , 34 F.4th 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation and in- ternal quotation marks omitted). And “in every statutory-interpre- tation case, we start with the text—and, if we find it clear, we end there as well.” Heyman v. Cooper , 31 F.4th 1315, 1318 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The text of the guidelines makes clear that a “controlled substance” includes a sub- stance that is regulated only by the law of the state of conviction.
Although the guidelines do not define “controlled sub- stance,” they define “controlled substance offense” broadly to in- clude “an offense under federal or state law.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). As a matter of ordinary language, if state law can define what qualifies as a controlled substance offense, “it fol- lows that it can also define what drugs are controlled substances.” Lewis , 58 F.4th at 769. Opinion of the Court
Moreover, section 4B1.2(b) does not expressly reference the federal Controlled Substances Act in its definition of controlled substance offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (“an offense under federal or state law . . . that . . . prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to . . . distrib- ute”). This omission is notable because “the Guidelines often do cross-reference the United States Code in that way.” Lewis , 58 F.4th at 769. Indeed, the immediately preceding provision does so when defining “crime of violence.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (“any of- fense under federal or state law . . . that . . . is . . . the use or unlaw- ful possession of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. [ section ] 5845(a) or explosive material as defined in 18 U.S.C. [ section ] 841(c) ” (emphasis added)). “With this definition, the Sentencing Commission demon- strated that it knew how to” define state offenses by reference to federal law “when it meant to do so.” See Dupree , 57 F.4th at 1278; accord Ruth , 966 F.3d at 651 (“The Sentencing Commission clearly knows how to cross-reference federal statutory definitions when it wants to.”). But it did not do so here. We must respect the Com- mission’s decision to “use[] particular language in one section but omit[] it in another.” Dupree , 57 F.4th at 1278 (alterations adopted) (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean , 574 U.S. 383, 391 (2015)). “This ‘interpretive canon applies with particular force’ where,” as here, “the provision that includes specific language is in ‘close prox- imity’ to the provision that excludes it.” Id. (alterations adopted) (quoting MacLean , 574 U.S. at 392) (referring to section 4B1.2(b) and section 4B1.2(a) as “sister subsections”). Opinion of the Court
Our precedent supports our rejection of the federal-law- only approach. We have held that a state statute need not include the same elements as a generic “federal analogue[]” crime to con- stitute a controlled substance offense because “the sentencing guidelines d[o] not define ‘controlled substance offense’ by refer- ence to those analogues.” United States v. Pridgeon , 853 F.3d 1192, 1198 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Smith , 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014)). And the identity of “marijuana” as the sub- stance possessed is undoubtedly an element of Dubois’s statute of conviction, which criminalizes “possess[ion] with intent to distrib- ute marijuana .” G A . C ODE § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2013) (emphasis added).
The two sister-circuit decisions adopting the federal-law- only approach do not persuade us. The Second Circuit selected that rule by relying on the presumption that “the application of a fed- eral law does not depend on state law.” Townsend , 897 F.3d at 71 (citing Jerome v. United States , 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (“[W]e must generally assume, in the absence of a plain indication to the con- trary, that Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the ap- plication of the federal act dependent on state law.”)). But that pre- sumption is overcome by the plain text of section 4B1.2(b), which defines “controlled substance offense” with express reference to state law. E.g. , Lewis , 58 F.4th at 769.
Nor are we swayed by the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit that our approach undermines the guidelines’ “goal[]” of uni- formity. See Bautista , 989 F.3d at 702; U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 1.3 (explaining that one of Congress’s “objectives” in enacting the Opinion of the Court Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to create “reasonable uni- formity in sentencing”). Although we have cited the guidelines’ goal of sentencing uniformity, we have cautioned that this goal can- not “alone justify” a particular interpretation of a guideline and cannot “be used to contradict the [guideline’s] text.” See United States v. Bryant , 996 F.3d 1243, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Est. of Keeter v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue , 75 F.4th 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2023) (stating that “we are not at liberty” to “override” plain text by recourse to “broad purposes” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). In any event, as another circuit has explained, “the sentencing goal of uniformity is illusory” in this context because both approaches yield some differential treatment between similarly situated de- fendants. See Lewis , 58 F.4th at 770 (explaining how “uniformity is unattainable” under any interpretation).
Because Dubois’s underlying conviction was under Georgia law, we consult Georgia law to determine whether the substance that he trafficked is a “controlled substance” under the guidelines. We recognize that the Georgia and federal definitions of “mariju- ana” were the same at all relevant times: both definitions included hemp at the time of Dubois’s state conviction but excluded it at the time of his federal sentencing. But we reject the parties’ suggestion that we need not decide which sovereign’s law controls to decide this appeal. As our following discussion illustrates, our answer to this “whose law” question informs our answer to the “what time” question that follows. Opinion of the Court
2. “Controlled Substance” is Defined by the Law in Effect at the
Time of the Prior State Conviction. Next, we must decide whether the guideline definition of “controlled substance offense” incorporates the state drug sched- ules in effect when Dubois was convicted of his state drug offense or the version in effect when he was sentenced for his federal fire- arm offense. We presume under the categorical approach that Du- bois was convicted for trafficking hemp, which the parties agree was the least culpable conduct criminalized. So if district courts must look to the time of conviction, the district court correctly concluded that Dubois’s 2013 Georgia marijuana conviction is a “controlled substance offense” under the guidelines because hemp was a controlled substance under Georgia law at that time. But if district courts must instead look to the time of sentencing, hemp’s delisting from the state drug schedules before sentencing means that Dubois’s 2013 conviction is not a controlled substance offense and that the enhancement was improper.
Our sister circuits are split on this timing question. Three have adopted a time-of-state-conviction approach. See Lewis , 58 F.4th at 771; United States v. Clark , 46 F.4th 404, 406 (6th Cir. 2022), cert. denied , 144 S. Ct. 107 (2023); United States v. Perez , 46 F.4th 691, 703 (8th Cir. 2022). Two others follow a time-of-federal-sentencing approach. See United States v. Abdulaziz , 998 F.3d 519, 524 (1st Cir. 2021); Bautista , 989 F.3d at 703; see also United States v. Gibson , 55 F.4th 153, 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2022) (concluding that a time-of-sentenc- ing rule is “more appropriate” but declining to decide whether “the Opinion of the Court district court should consult the [Controlled Substances Act] ver- sion at the time of the defendant’s current offense or the version at the time of his sentencing for this offense, since the controlled sub- stance schedules were narrower than state law at both times”), ad- hered to on reh’g , 60 F.4th 720 (2d Cir. 2023).
We adopt a time-of-state-conviction rule: the term “con- trolled substance,” see U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), 4B1.2(b), means a substance regulated by state law when the defendant was convicted of the state drug offense, even if it is no longer regulated when the defendant is sentenced for the federal firearm offense. This rule fol- lows from the text of the guidelines and Supreme Court precedent.
We begin again with the text. The guideline assigns the de- fendant a base offense level of 20 if he “committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a controlled substance offense.” Id . § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). The phrase “subsequent to” supports a backward-looking approach in defining the contents of the prior state conviction because that phrase “di- rect[s] the court’s attention to events that occurred in the past.” Clark , 46 F.4th at 409. True, the guideline defining “controlled sub- stance offense” includes present-tense language: it refers to a felony offense “that prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to . . . distribute.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). But as the Supreme Court has explained in a similar con- text, an ordinary reader would understand that the guideline refers to a conviction that occurred in the past and that the definition pro- vision “use[s] the present tense to refer to [that] past conviction[].” Opinion of the Court See McNeill v. United States , 563 U.S. 816, 822 (2011). Defining an ear- lier conviction by reference to laws that did not exist at the time of that conviction would be an unusual interpretation of this ordinary language.
The Supreme Court’s decision in McNeill supports this inter- pretation. McNeill involved “a closely related question” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Clark , 46 F.4th at 409. The Act imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for a person convicted of a federal firearm offense who “has three pre- vious convictions” of a “serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A “serious drug offense” includes “an offense under State law, involving . . . possessing with intent to . . . distribute[] a controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprison- ment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). McNeill argued that his prior state drug convic- tions were not “serious drug offenses” because the state had low- ered the maximum penalty for those offenses after he was con- victed. McNeill , 563 U.S. at 818.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the “plain text” of the Armed Career Criminal Act requires sentencing courts to consider the maximum penalties in place at the time of the state conviction, not those in place at the time of the federal firearms sentencing. Id. at 820. The Court reasoned that the phrase “previ- ous convictions” in the Act calls for a “backward-looking” inquiry, answerable only by “consult[ing] the law that applied at the time of that conviction.” Id. And the Court explained that the “[u]se of Opinion of the Court the present tense in the definition of ‘serious drug offense’”— which refers to a maximum penalty that “ is prescribed by law”— “does not suggest otherwise.” Id. (emphasis added). The “natural reading” of the text clearly “is concerned with convictions that have already occurred”; Congress “used the present tense to refer to past convictions.” Id. at 820, 822. It would be “absurd,” the Court explained, to permit “subsequent changes in state law [to] erase an earlier conviction” under the Act. Id. at 822–23. That interpretation would also yield “dramatically different federal sentences” for de- fendants “who violated [section] 922(g) on the same day and who had identical criminal histories” based “solely” on the happen- stance of their federal sentencing dates. Id. at 823. The time-of- state-conviction approach, in contrast, promotes fair notice and uniformity by allowing “a defendant to know even before he vio- lates [section] 922(g) whether [the Act] would apply.” Id. Although this interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Act does not bind our interpretation of the guidelines, McNeill ’s analysis “is nonethe- less instructive” because the two provisions are similar. See United States v. Patton , 114 F.3d 174, 177 (11th Cir. 1997); cf. United States v. Fritts , 841 F.3d 937, 940 n.4 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Because the relevant parts of the definition of ‘violent felony’ under the [Armed Career Criminal Act] and ‘crime of violence’ under the Sentencing Guide- lines are identical, this Court often considers cases interpreting the language in the Sentencing Guidelines as authority in cases inter- preting the language in the [Act].”).
The four reasons that led the Supreme Court in McNeill to adopt a time-of-state-conviction approach under the Armed Career Opinion of the Court Criminal Act apply readily to our interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. First, just as the phrase “previous convictions” in the Act requires a backward-looking approach in defining “controlled substance” under the Act, the phrase “subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction” in the guidelines requires a backward-looking approach in defining “controlled substance” under the guidelines. Second, just as the present-tense phrase “is prescribed by law” does not change that result under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the present-tense term “prohibits” does not change it under the guide- lines either. Third, just as “[i]t cannot be correct that subsequent changes in state law can erase an earlier conviction” under the Act, McNeill , 563 U.S. at 823, it cannot be correct that later changes in state law can erase an earlier conviction under the guidelines. Fi- nally, because the Supreme Court declined to adopt an approach under the Act that would make its “applicability depend on the tim- ing of the federal sentencing proceeding,” id. , we decline to adopt such an approach under the guidelines.
The circuits that have adopted a time-of-federal-sentencing interpretation bypassed McNeill ’s reasoning on a ground not appli- cable here. Those circuits all applied the federal-law-only approach for defining which drugs are controlled substances under the guide- lines. See Bautista , 989 F.3d at 702; Abdulaziz , 998 F.3d at 523 & n.2 (applying the federal-law-only approach because the government forfeited, by not timely raising, the argument that a state-law ap- proach applied); see also Gibson , 55 F.4th at 164. Having selected that approach, the issue before those courts became which version of the federal drug schedules courts must consult to determine Opinion of the Court whether a prior drug conviction involved a “controlled substance.” The question in McNeill was different, these courts reasoned, be- cause it involved an intervening change in state law , not federal law. Bautista , 989 F.3d at 703 (“Unlike in McNeill , the state law in our case has not changed. Rather, federal law has changed.”); Gibson , 55 F.4th at 162 (“[T]he focus [in McNeill ] was not on federal law but only on North Carolina law.”); Abdulaziz , 998 F.3d at 530 (“[I]n McNeill , the Court did not consider—because it had no occasion to consider—the issue of what temporal version of the federal drug schedules was relevant.”). Putting aside whether that distinction warrants a departure from McNeill ’s reasoning, the distinction is absent here. Because we hold that state law defines which drugs are controlled substances for state predicate offenses, the focus here, as in McNeill , is state law. And Dubois’s arguments for applying a time- of-sentencing rule run headlong into McNeill .
To sum up, we hold that a “controlled substance” under sec- tion 4B1.2(b)’s definition of “controlled substance offense” is, for prior state offenses, a drug regulated by state law at the time of the conviction, even if it is not federally regulated, and even if it is no longer regulated by the state at the time of federal sentencing. Be- cause Georgia law regulated marijuana—including hemp—at the time of Dubois’s 2013 conviction, the district court did not err by enhancing Dubois’s base-offense level under section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Opinion of the Court D. Our Precedent Bars Dubois’s Challenge to the Stolen-Gun Enhancement.
The district court enhanced Dubois’s base offense level un- der the guidelines after finding that one of the guns he possessed had been stolen. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) (“If any firearm . . . was stolen, increase by 2 levels.”). We have held that this enhance- ment does not require proof that the defendant knew that the gun was stolen. See United States v. Richardson , 8 F.3d 769, 770 (11th Cir. 1993) (“The provisions of [section] 2K2.1(b)(4) are not ambiguous; there is clearly no mens rea requirement.”); accord United States v. Holden , 61 F.3d 858, 860 (11th Cir. 1995). Dubois argues that the guideline’s lack of a mens rea element violates his Fifth Amend- ment right to due process. But we rejected that argument in Rich- ardson : “the lack of a mens rea element in the sentencing enhance- ment for possession of a stolen firearm does not offend due process because [section] 2K2.1(b)(4) does not create a crime separate and apart from the underlying felony.” 8 F.3d at 770.
Dubois acknowledges that our precedent bars his challenge, but he asks us to “revisit” and “overturn” it in the light of Kisor v. Wilkie , 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). Kisor holds that courts may not give controlling deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own reg- ulation unless the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous.” Id. at 2414. And we have extended this rule to commentary interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines. Dupree , 57 F.4th at 1276. The commentary to the stolen-gun guideline states that the enhancement applies “re- gardless of whether the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm was stolen.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 n.8(B). Dubois argues Opinion of the Court that deference to this commentary violates Kisor because the com- mentary “impermissibly expands the application of the guideline” beyond its plain meaning.
Dubois attacks a strawman. Richardson did not mention the commentary to the stolen-gun enhancement—the decision rested only on the guideline’s text, which this Court held was “not ambig- uous” and “clearly” imposed “no mens rea requirement.” 8 F.3d at 770. It is true that our later decision in Holden cites both Richardson and the challenged commentary when reiterating that “knowledge that [the gun] is stolen property is not a prerequisite to the applica- tion of [section] 2K2.1(b)(4).” Holden , 61 F.3d at 860. But the Holden Court did not purport to give the commentary “controlling weight,” so that decision does not implicate Kisor ’s limitations on Auer deference. See Rafferty v. Denny’s, Inc. , 13 F.4th 1166, 1179 (11th Cir. 2021). Even if it had, to the extent that Holden ’s reasoning de- parts from Richardson ’s, Richardson ’s controls. See MacPhee v. MiMedx Grp. , 73 F.4th 1220, 1250 (11th Cir. 2023) (under the “earli- est case” rule, when prior panel precedents conf lict, the earlier case controls (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Thomp- son v. Alabama , 65 F.4th 1288, 1301 (11th Cir. 2023) (a later panel is bound by “the reasoning” of “the first panel’s ruling” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We affirm the application of the stolen-gun enhancement.
E. The District Court did Not Plainly Err by Imposing a Fine. Dubois’s final challenge is to the district court’s imposition of a low-end $25,000 fine. He argues that he is unable to pay the Opinion of the Court fine and that the district court was required to, but did not, provide reasons for imposing it. We reject his challenge and affirm the fine. The guidelines require the district court to impose a fine in every case, unless “the defendant establishes” that he is presently unable to pay a fine and will not likely become able to pay one in the future. U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(a). If the defendant fails to prove pre- sent and future inability to pay, the district court must impose a fine, see id. , and will consider eight factors to determine the appro- priate amount, see id. § 5E1.2(d). But if “the defendant did not ob- ject to the fine at sentencing,” the sentencing court is “not re- quire[d] . . . to make specific findings of fact with respect to the Sentencing Guideline factors”; we will affirm if “the record sup- port[s] the fine.” See United States v. Gonzalez , 541 F.3d 1250, 1256 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Hernandez , 160 F.3d at 665–66 (affirming fine, despite presentence investigation report finding that “the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine,” because the defendant did not object to the fine at sentencing and “the record suggest[ed] that [he] may be able to pay” it).
Although we ordinarily review for clear error a finding that a defendant can afford a fine, see United States v. McGuinness , 451 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006), we review only for plain error if the defendant fails to object on the basis of his inability to pay the fine, see Hernandez , 160 F.3d at 665. To preserve clear-error review, an objection must be specific enough to “adequately apprise[] the trial court of the true basis for [the] objection.” United States v. Opinion of the Court Williford , 764 F.2d 1493, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). So “a general objection or an objection on other grounds will not suffice.” United States v. Gallo-Chamorro , 48 F.3d 502, 507 (11th Cir. 1995). Nor will “vague reference[s] to [the] concern.” Williford , 764 F.2d at 1502. The defendant also must “specifically and clearly object” to any disputed facts listed in the presentence investigation report; otherwise, those facts are deemed admitted, and the district court is entitled to rely on them at sen- tencing. United States v. Corbett , 921 F.3d 1032, 1043 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Dubois failed to object on the basis of his inability to pay the fine in response to the presentence investigation report or during his sentencing hearing, so we review his objection for plain error. In his objections to the report, Dubois did not challenge the proba- tion officer’s assertion that he could afford a fine of up to $250,000. Nor did he challenge any of the findings about his assets, liabilities, income, or ability to work for pay while incarcerated. And during the sentencing hearing, defense counsel made only a vague, gen- eral objection—challenging both the fine and sentence as “substan- tively unreasonable.” “This abstract and general objection did not inform the district court of [Dubois]’s specific objections to [the fine], and [Dubois] thereby deprived the court of the opportunity to consider (and if necessary correct) them.” See United States v. Car- penter , 803 F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2015). Dubois’s counsel never argued that Dubois could not afford to pay the fine or otherwise asked the district court for “‘further findings with respect to the fine.’” Gonzalez , 541 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Hernandez , 160 F.3d at Opinion of the Court 666). These challenges, which Dubois raises for the first time on appeal, are not challenges to the substantive reasonableness of the fine. See United States v. Bradley , 644 F.3d 1213, 1304 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the defendant’s inability to pay a fine does not make it “substantively unreasonable”); Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that challenging the district court’s “fail[ure] to adequately explain the chosen sentence” challenges the sentence’s procedural reasonableness, not its substantive reasonable- ness).
The district court did not plainly err by imposing a $25,000 fine without explanation because the record contains unchallenged evidence of Dubois’s ability to pay it. See Hernandez , 160 F.3d at 665–66. Even on appeal, Dubois does not dispute the probation of- ficer’s findings that Dubois had a total net worth of over $54,000 (more than double the fine amount), that he had an additional monthly income of over $3,000, or that he was “able-bodied and could work while in custody to make minimal payments towards any fine.” Nor does he dispute that he failed to respond to the pro- bation officer’s request for financial information, which we have said may support the inference that the defendant is concealing ad- ditional assets. See, e.g. , id. at 666 (stating that a defendant’s “unwill- ingness to answer specific questions concerning his financial deal- ings put to him by the probation officer who prepared the [presen- tence investigation report] may permit the inference that he is still concealing assets”). The district court was permitted to rely on this undisputed record evidence to find that Dubois could pay a $25,000 fine. Opinion of the Court
IV. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM Dubois’s convictions and sentence. R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring R OSENBAUM , Circuit Judge, joined by A BUDU , Circuit Judge, Con- curring:
I concur in today’s decision, including the conclusion that we must look to state law at the time of the prior conviction to determine whether, under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), the defendant has a prior conviction that qualifies him for a sentencing enhance- ment. I reach this conclusion because the combination of the text of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in McNeill v. United States , 563 U.S. 816 (2011), compel it.
That said, I write separately for two reasons. First, I explain that today’s approach is correct regardless of the Supreme Court’s forthcoming decisions in Jackson v. United States , No. 22-6640, and Brown v. United States , No. 22-6389. Second, I identify two policy reasons in favor of revising the Sentencing Guidelines to take a time-of-sentencing approach.
A. No matter how the Court rules, Jackson and Brown
are distinguishable.
I begin with a brief discussion of Jackson and Brown . I then explain that, however the Court rules, those decisions are unlikely to alter our conclusion that Dubois’s state conviction is a “con- trolled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Both Jackson and Brown concerned the definition of “serious drug offense” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Under that definition, a prior state offense qualifies as a “serious drug offense” if it is R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring
an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or dis- tribute, a controlled substance ( as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
Jackson challenged his ACCA enhancement, asserting that his prior cocaine-related state convictions did not qualify as “seri- ous drug offenses.” United States v. Jackson , 55 F.4th 846, 850 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. granted , 143 S. Ct. 2457 (2023). Jackson argued that his prior cocaine-related state conviction was categorically over- broad because the state’s definition of “cocaine” was broader than the federal definition at the time of his federal firearm offense. Id. at 851. We rejected this argument, holding that the definition of “serious drug offense” incorporates the version of the federal Con- trolled Substances Act (“CSA”) in effect at the time of the defend- ant’s prior state drug conviction, not the version in effect at the time of the later federal firearm offense or sentencing. Id. at 849. Like today’s decision, we relied heavily on McNeill and its procla- mation that ACCA requires a ‘“backward-looking’ inquiry” so as not to “erase an earlier [state] conviction for ACCA purposes.” Id. at 855–56 (alteration in original) (quoting McNeill , 563 U.S. at 820, 823).
Similarly, Brown challenged his ACCA enhancement based on a prior state marijuana conviction. United States v. Brown , 47 R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring F.4th 147, 148 (3d Cir. 2022), cert. granted , 143 S. Ct. 2458 (2023). He asserted that his prior state offense no longer qualified as a “serious drug offense” after Congress amended the federal CSA to remove hemp from the definition of “marijuana.” Id. The Third Circuit applied the federal CSA in effect when Brown committed his fed- eral offense, not at the time of his prior state conviction or at the time of federal sentencing. Id. at 155.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this timing question—whether a sentencing court applies the federal CSA at the time of the prior state conviction, federal firearm offense, or federal sentencing when imposing an ACCA enhancement.
Unlike Jackson and Brown , Dubois’s case arises under the Sen- tencing Guidelines, not under ACCA. And that makes all the dif- ference, if the Supreme Court concludes in Jackson and Brown that ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” requires courts to con- sider the federal controlled-substances lists applicable at the time of the federal firearm offense (or sentencing) rather than at the time of the prior state offense.
ACCA defines the term “controlled substance” with express reference to the federal CSA. See 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (defining “serious drug offense” as “an offense under State law, involving . . . a controlled substance ( as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802) ” (emphasis added). During the Jack- son and Brown oral arguments, the Supreme Court homed in on this part of the definition of “serious drug offense.” In particular, the Justices posited that, by referencing the CSA by name, R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring Congress may have intended for ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” to incorporate only those substances appearing on the federal controlled-substances lists at the time of the federal fire- arms offense (or federal sentencing). See Transcript of Oral Argu- ment at 57, Jackson , No. 22-6640 (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2023) (Gor- such, J.) (“[N]ormally when we have a cross-reference, we look at the contemporaneous version of the cross-reference.”); id. at 56 (Sotomayor, J.) (“[W]hen you’re cross-referencing something, you’re taking everything with it”.); id. at 69 (Jackson, J.) (“Do you concede that a change in the drug schedules reflects a change in what is considered to be a serious drug offense?”); id. at 86 (Thomas, J.) (a change to the federal CSA “seems to be in effect an amendment of ACCA”); id. at 74–75 (Kagan, J.) (similar).
In other words, by expressly referencing the CSA and incor- porating its definition of “controlled substance” into ACCA, Con- gress intended that ACCA would effectively be amended every time that Congress amended the CSA (or the Attorney General up- dated the CSA lists [1] ). So to trigger an ACCA enhancement, a de- fendant’s prior state drug conviction would have to involve a sub- stance on the federal controlled-substances lists at the time of the federal firearm offense (or federal sentencing). And if it did not, R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring that prior state conviction could not qualify under ACCA as a “se- rious drug offense.”
But the text of ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” and the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense” dif- fer in three important ways that make any such holding in Jackson and Brown inapplicable to the Sentencing Guidelines context.
First, unlike ACCA, section 4B1.2(b) does not cross-refer- ence the federal CSA (or any other specific law, for that matter) or otherwise define “controlled substance.” Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Rather, the guideline refers generally to only “an offense under federal or state law . . . that [in- volves] . . . a controlled substance . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (empha- sis added). This differs from ACCA, which directs that a “con- trolled substance” is what the federal CSA says it is, no matter how state law defines it. Under the guideline, though, for the reasons Chief Judge Pryor explains in the panel opinion, we must look to state law to discern the meaning of “controlled substance” with re- spect to a state conviction.
Because the guideline lacks a cross-reference to another specified law, it does not provide the same basis that ACCA’s text may for us to adopt the meaning of “controlled substance” at the time of the federal firearm offense (or federal sentencing).
Second, while Congress can amend the federal CSA (and thus effectively ACCA) at any time, it cannot amend state drug schedules. Nor can the federal Sentencing Commission. So R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring Congress’s amendment of the federal CSA or any other federal law [2] doesn’t allow us to conclude that a newer version of state con- trolled-substances lists govern.
Nor can states amend the federal Sentencing Guidelines. So it makes little sense to condition application of the federal Guide- lines on changes in state law if the text of the guideline in question does not otherwise require it.
Third, because the Guidelines lack any statutory cross-refer- ence—and that is the only material difference between ACCA’s def- inition of “serious drug offense” the Guidelines’ definition of “con- trolled substance offense”—nothing allows us to persuasively dis- tinguish McNeill . McNeill requires us to look to the state’s penalty for the prior state offense at the time of the prior state conviction, not at the time of the federal firearm offense (or federal sentenc- ing), if the state has amended that penalty. 563 U.S. at 825. That’s so because the term “previous convictions” in ACCA directs a “backward-looking” inquiry, and “subsequent changes in state law [do not] erase an earlier conviction.” Id. at 820, 823.
In the same way, section 2K2.1(a)(4) requires a backward- looking inquiry by directing courts to consider whether “the de- fendant committed any part of the [federal firearm] offense subse- quent to sustaining ” a felony “controlled substance” conviction. R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4) (emphasis added). The guideline’s plain text aligns it with McNeill and distinguishes it from Jackson , however the Supreme Court rules.
Indeed, if the Supreme Court upholds our ruling in Jackson , then as in that case, McNeill drives the answer here. The only ma- terial difference between Jackson and Dubois’s fact patterns is that Jackson’s sentence was enhanced under ACCA, and Dubois’s was enhanced under the Sentencing Guidelines. So if McNeill ’s reason- ing controls Jackson —even considering ACCA’s statutory cross-ref- erence—it must likewise dictate the outcome here, where there is no cross-reference.
But if the Supreme Court reverses Jackson —holding that ACCA’s express reference to the CSA requires us to consult the CSA as it existed at the time of the federal offense (or federal sentenc- ing)—that reasoning doesn’t translate to the Guidelines context be- cause the Guidelines lack an express cross-reference to another stat- ute. So whatever the Supreme Court may decide about ACCA’s unique text and the question of which version of the federal CSA governs under it, that decision does not bear on the distinct ques- tion of which version of the state’s controlled-substances lists gov- erns in the Guidelines context. See Jackson , 55 F.4th at 856 n.7 (quot- ing Brown , 47 F.4th at 154) (“longstanding principles of statutory interpretation allow different results under the Guidelines as op- posed to under the ACCA”).
In short, McNeill and the text of the Guidelines require us to conclude that Dubois’s state marijuana conviction remains a R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines even if it would not qualify as a “serious drug offense” under ACCA. So I concur in today’s judgment.
B. The Sentencing Commission should consider revising the guidelines to take a time-of-sentencing approach.
As I’ve explained, I believe that our holding today is legally compelled. But at least two policy reasons suggest that the Sen- tencing Commission may wish to revisit the guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense.”
First, as the First Circuit has pointed out, “[a] guideline’s en- hancement for a defendant’s past criminal conduct—such as the enhancement that [U.S.S.G.] § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) imposes—is reasona- bly understood to be based in no small part on a judgment about how problematic that past conduct is when viewed as of the time of the sentencing itself.” United States v. Abdulaziz , 998 F.3d 519, 528 (1st Cir. 2021). So when the state that criminalized the conduct underlying the defendant’s prior conviction determines that con- duct no longer warrants treatment as a criminal offense, that is ev- idence that the state no longer views the underlying conduct as problematic. [3] As a result, it undercuts the basis for enhancing the R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring defendant’s sentence based on his prior conviction for that con- duct.
Second, whether or not section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A)’s enhance- ment applies, the criminal-history axis already captures the prior sentence. See id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a)–(c); ch. 5, pt. A). The criminal-history axis was designed specifically, at least in part, to send “a clear message . . . to society that repeated criminal behavior will aggravate the need for punishment with each recurrence.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual ch. 4, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018). In other words, the criminal-history axis considers that a defendant has more than once participated in con- duct criminal at the time that the defendant engaged in it.
Besides that, even without the guideline’s enhancement, the sentencing judge retains the discretion to account further for the defendant’s criminal history at sentencing. See Abdulaziz , 998 F.3d at 528. But as section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) stands, it tethers the guidelines calculation—the starting place for all sentences—to a state’s legis- lative judgment of the past, even if the state legislature has since retracted that judgment. So it can result in a defendant serving a longer prison sentence based only on conduct that is no longer a crime. A defendant’s liberty should not depend on a “quirk of tim- ing.” Abdulaziz , 998 F.3d at 529.
In my view, these circumstances provide good reason for the Sentencing Commission to consider expressly whether section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) should apply to prior convictions that would not qualify as predicate crimes under the law as it exists at the time of R OSENBAUM , J., Concurring sentencing. And if the Supreme Court takes a time-of-sentencing approach in Brown and Jackson , the Sentencing Commission may especially want to do so for the sake of consistency. But, again, regardless of those potential developments, Dubois’s state mariju- ana conviction remains a “controlled substance offense” under the sentencing guidelines, and the district court’s sentencing enhance- ment was proper.
[1] The Controlled Substances Act authorizes the Attorney General to “remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any sched- ule.” 21 U.S.C. § 811(a); see also id. § 812 n.1 (“Revised schedules are published in the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1308 of Title 21, Food and Drugs.”).
[2] Of course, Congress could adopt alterations to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) or § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) itself that expressly incorporate any state updates to their con- trolled-substances lists. But that did not happen here.
[3] For instance, as of last year, twenty-three states have legalized small amounts of marijuana for recreational use, and others have acted to reduce or eliminate penalties for drug use and possession. See Michael Hartman, Cannabis Over- view , Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures (Nov. 8, 2023), https://perma.cc/S2PM- 52Q8.