State v. Terwilliger, 314 Conn. 618

Background

In 2005 Terwilliger was tried for killing Donald Kennedy; jury acquitted him of murder but convicted him of first‑degree manslaughter with a firearm (general verdict). Appellate reversal ordered a new trial based on a jury instruction error.
At retrial in 2011 the state charged both intentional manslaughter (§ 53a‑55(a)(1)) and reckless manslaughter (§ 53a‑55(a)(3)) with a firearm; jury convicted of intentional manslaughter with a firearm.
Defendant moved to dismiss the second prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, arguing the 2005 general verdict might have been an acquittal of the intentional theory; trial court denied the motion.
Defendant also sought a § 53a‑20 (defense of premises) instruction defining “crime of violence” broadly (including burglary, assault, etc.) and asked that the court instruct on elements of those offenses; the court gave a narrower examples‑based definition and declined to instruct on individual elements.
Supreme Court affirmed: rejected double jeopardy reversal because inferring the first jury’s specific mental‑state finding would be speculative and any prejudice was absent; held the trial court’s narrower definition of “crime of violence” was legally supportable and, given the lack of evidence that burglary/arson was reasonably believed by defendant, omission of element instructions was harmless.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Terwilliger)	Held
Whether retrial and 2011 conviction for intentional manslaughter violated double jeopardy because the 2005 general verdict may have acquitted intent theory	No; the 2005 general guilty verdict on one statutory crime (manslaughter) is ambiguous as to alternative means and does not operate as an acquittal of a particular mental‑state; the state may retry under either alternative theory when conviction was reversed on appeal	Yes; because the 2005 jury convicted of manslaughter without specifying intent or recklessness, it is reasonably possible the jury acquitted the intentional theory, so retrial on that theory violated double jeopardy unless state proves beyond a reasonable doubt there was no such acquittal	Affirmed. Court refused to speculate about the first jury’s reasoning; statute treats the two subdivisions as alternative means of single offense and defendant showed no prejudice under unique facts.
Proper scope of “crime of violence” in § 53a‑20 (defense of premises) and whether jury must be instructed on elements of listed crimes	Narrow reading tied to common‑law violent felonies that are not already covered by § 53a‑19; examples suffice; no need to instruct on elements where no evidence supports the particular offense (e.g., burglary/arson)	Broad reading (parole board list / federal § 16) and requested list of statutory offenses should be used; jury should be instructed on elements of each included offense so defendant’s justification could be assessed	Court: definition used by trial court was consistent with common‑law understanding and ejusdem generis (limited to violent felonies not duplicative of § 53a‑19); only burglary and arson possibly fit, but no evidence supported them so omission of element instructions was harmless.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621 (2010) (when joinder of a jeopardy‑barred and non‑barred offense risks prejudice, state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that joinder did not prejudice defendant)
State v. Boyd, 221 Conn. 685 (1992) (jeopardy continues when conviction is reversed on appeal; waiver and related procedural principles)
State v. King, 216 Conn. 585 (1990) (statutory definitions of "intentionally" and "recklessly" are mutually exclusive in some contexts)
State v. Tanzella, 226 Conn. 601 (1993) (different statutory subdivisions may be alternative means of committing a single crime)
State v. Havican, 213 Conn. 593 (1990) (interpreting statutory self‑defense provisions in light of common‑law background)
United States v. Garcia, 938 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1991) (general verdict ambiguous as to alternative theories does not necessarily bar retrial on a permissible theory; courts should avoid speculative inferences)
United States v. Green, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (jury’s silence or dismissal without verdict on a charge may in some circumstances operate as an implicit acquittal)
United States ex rel. Jackson v. Follette, 462 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1972) (balancing public interest and defendant’s protection where alternative means produce retrial; harmlessness and evidentiary overlap may counsel against double jeopardy relief)
State v. Perkins, 88 Conn. 360 (1914) (common‑law treatment of defense of dwelling permits deadly force when intruder’s entry threatens life or great bodily harm)