State v. Teal
121454
| Kan. Ct. App. | Jun 11, 2021Background
- KBI Agent Chris Farris recruited Joseph Byrd, a cooperating informant and Teal’s former son‑in‑law, to perform a controlled buy of methamphetamine in Parsons. Byrd had agreed to cooperate to avoid jail on unrelated charges.
- Byrd communicated with a Facebook account under the name Sebastian Stewart (whose profile picture appeared to show Teal); Byrd told the agent he believed Teal operated that account.
- During the purchase Byrd met a man who arrived on a motorcycle, spoke with him, and then moved into an alley; Byrd returned with meth and identified that man as Teal. Farris videoed the approach from a distance but could not see or identify the dealer in the alley.
- Evidence at trial included Facebook message screenshots, a recorded Facebook Messenger call, Byrd’s hidden audio recording of the deal, and Farris’s distant video; Byrd testified he learned the Sebastian Stewart connection by “word of mouth” in the drug community.
- The district court instructed the jury to view informant testimony with caution. The jury convicted Teal of distributing 1–3.5 grams of methamphetamine; Teal appealed challenging (1) sufficiency of evidence on identity and (2) admission of Byrd’s ‘‘word of mouth’’ statements as hearsay/prior bad‑act evidence.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Teal's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Teal was the dealer | Evidence (Byrd ID, Facebook messages/call, Byrd’s hidden audio, and Farris’s surveillance) permitted a rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt | Byrd was an unreliable, self‑interested informant and there was inadequate corroboration tying Teal to the Facebook account or motorcycle dealer | Conviction affirmed; viewed in light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient and credibility/resolution of conflicts are for the jury (Chandler standard) |
| Admission of Byrd’s ‘‘word of mouth’’ statement that Teal ran the Sebastian Stewart account (hearsay/prior bad acts) | The statement was explanatory of Byrd’s belief and not offered as proof of a prior specific crime; admission did not affect the verdict | Statement was impermissible hearsay and/or inadmissible prior‑bad‑act evidence under K.S.A. 60‑455 | Court found the remark was more reputation/belief than a specific prior act, not barred by 60‑455; even if erroneous, admission was harmless because Byrd also testified from direct contact and other evidence supported identity |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Chandler, 307 Kan. 657 (establishes sufficiency review: view evidence in light most favorable to the State; appellate court does not reweigh evidence)
- State v. Brinklow, 288 Kan. 39 (uncorroborated testimony can sustain a conviction unless it is incredible or defies belief)
- State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419 (distinguishes reputation/generalized statements from evidence of a specific prior act under K.S.A. 60‑455)
