State v. Taylor (Slip Opinion)
2020 Ohio 6786
Ohio2020Background
- Robert Taylor was found indigent and appointed counsel after indictment; he pleaded guilty to amended kidnapping and gross-sexual-imposition charges and the State and Taylor jointly recommended community-control sanctions.
- At sentencing the trial court imposed community control and ordered Taylor to pay a $130 court-appointed-counsel fee, listing it in the sentencing entry’s financial-obligations and reimbursements sections.
- Taylor appealed; the Second District held R.C. 2941.51(D) creates a presumption that the county pays appointed-counsel fees and required trial courts to make explicit on-the-record findings of a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing any such fees.
- The Ohio Supreme Court accepted a certified conflict, consolidated the appeals, and asked supplemental questions about (1) the trial court’s authority to order payment, (2) whether such fees may be included in a criminal sentence, and (3) the effect of administrative indigency/recoupment rules.
- The Supreme Court held that R.C. 2941.51(D) does not require explicit on-the-record findings before assessing appointed-counsel fees, that trial courts may assess such fees (including at sentencing), but that those fees cannot be included as part of the criminal sentence and are civil assessments best entered separately; it reversed the Second District and vacated the portion of Taylor’s sentencing entry imposing the fee.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Taylor's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2941.51(D) requires explicit on-the-record findings of a defendant’s ability to pay before assessing appointed-counsel fees | Statute’s plain language imposes no such requirement; courts may assess without added textual prerequisites | Statute creates a presumption county pays; trial court must make explicit findings on record to shift any cost to defendant | No explicit-findings requirement; best practice is for courts to state findings on the record |
| Whether a trial court in a criminal case has authority to order a defendant to pay court-appointed-counsel fees | Reading R.C. 2941.51 with R.C. Chapter 120 (esp. 120.36(C)) supports trial-court authority to assess fees | Lack of express authorization in R.C. 2941.51 means fees must be imposed via separate civil judgment or administrative process, not as a criminal judgment | Trial court has authority to assess fees (statutes read in pari materia give that authority) |
| Whether court-appointed-counsel fees may be included as part of the defendant’s criminal sentence | Fees may be ordered at sentencing (State urged court authority to assess at that time) | Fees shouldn’t be part of sentence absent explicit statutory authority aligning them with costs or financial sanctions | Fees may be ordered at sentencing but cannot be included as part of the criminal sentence; they are civil assessments and should be entered separately |
| Whether Taylor’s fee order was lawful in his case | Trial court assessed fee at sentencing (implicitly acceptable) | PSI showed SSDI and no finding about ability to pay; counsel ineffective for failing to object | Fee portion of sentencing entry vacated because fees were improperly included in the sentence; court did not require remand for resentencing and left open a separate civil assessment consistent with law and local recoupment rules |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Consilio, 114 Ohio St.3d 295 (2007) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- State v. Paige, 153 Ohio St.3d 214 (2018) (courts must impose only sentences provided by statute)
- State v. Hitchcock, 157 Ohio St.3d 215 (2019) (same principle limiting judicial sentencing authority)
- State v. Droste, 83 Ohio St.3d 36 (1998) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius applied in statutory construction)
- Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116 (1997) (plain-error review in civil matters is disfavored)