315 Conn. 734
Conn.2015Background
- Defendant (Taylor G.), arrested for repeatedly sexually abusing his cousin C. between 2007–2009, when defendant was 14–15 and C was 6–7. Jury convicted on first‑degree sexual assault, fourth‑degree sexual assault, and risk of injury to a child.
- Sentencing: mandatory minimums applied—10 years for first‑degree sexual assault and 5 years mandatory for risk of injury—court imposed total effective sentence of 10 years incarceration + 3 years special parole.
- Defendant moved pre‑ and post‑trial: (1) challenge to constitutionality of mandatory minimums for a juvenile under the Eighth Amendment; (2) motion for new trial arguing state expert vouched for victim’s credibility; (3) objection to admission of prior sexual misconduct from when defendant was 13. All motions denied; defendant appealed.
- Trial included testimony and a recorded forensic interview of C; state expert (Montelli) testified about general characteristics of sexually abused children and conducted the interview shown to the jury.
- The court allowed C to testify about incidents beginning before the defendant’s 14th birthday but instructed the jury that only post‑14 conduct (after July 17, 2007) could support conviction and admitted the pre‑14 testimony to provide context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Constitutionality of mandatory minimums for juvenile offender under Eighth Amendment | State: Roper/Graham/Miller do not require striking down mandatory minimums far less severe than death or LWOP; sentencing court retained discretion to account for youth. | Defendant: Mandatory minima (10 & 5 yrs) prevent individualized, youth‑sensitive sentencing required by Eighth Amendment. | Held: Affirmed. Mandatory minima here are not the extreme punishments at issue in Roper/Graham/Miller and court retained meaningful discretion; sentences not cruel and unusual. |
| 2) Expert testimony vouching for victim (improper credibility opinion) | State: Montelli testified only to general patterns of abused children, did not opine on C’s credibility or compare C specifically. | Defendant: Montelli relied on C’s interview and effectively linked C’s behavior to characteristic abuse behaviors, impermissibly vouching (Favoccia issue). | Held: Affirmed. Montelli’s testimony remained general and did not state or imply that C exhibited those traits; cross‑examination and prosecutor’s instructions further limited any vouching risk. |
| 3) Admission of defendant’s pre‑14 sexual misconduct to show propensity | State: Prior incidents were admitted to give context and complete the story for the jury about when/how abuse began, not for propensity. | Defendant: Infancy/incapacity doctrine precludes using pre‑14 misconduct to show propensity; admission was improper. | Held: Claim unpreserved. Record shows evidence admitted for context and jury was properly instructed; no preserved objection on propensity grounds to review. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (prohibiting death penalty for juvenile offenders)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; requires consideration of youth)
- State v. Favoccia, 306 Conn. 770 (expert testimony that links complainant’s specific behavior to abuse characteristics can constitute impermissible vouching)
- State v. Spigarolo, 210 Conn. 359 (permitting general expert testimony on behavioral characteristics of child sexual abuse victims to assist jury assessment of credibility)