State v. Taylor, 269 P.3d 740

Taylor pled guilty in federal court (2006) to conspiracy to traffic Native American cultural items from Kanupa Cave; items were Native Hawaiian artifacts repatriated under NAGPRA.
Kanupa Cave artifacts were repatriated in 2003 and later removed from the cave by Taylor and an accomplice, with an appraised value in the hundreds of thousands to over a million dollars.
A Hawaii state grand jury indicted Taylor for Theft in the First Degree under HRS §§ 708-830(1), 708-830.5(1)(a) based on the Kanupa Cave artifacts.
The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, holding sufficient grand-jury evidence and that HRS § 701-112 did not bar the prosecution; it stated that ownership need not be identified in the indictment, only that the property was not Taylor’s.
Taylor sought certiorari; the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the ICA, holding (a) the grand jury had probable cause that the artifacts were the property of another, though ICA’s wording was incorrect, and (b) the state theft prosecution is not barred by HRS § 701-112 because it requires proof of a fact not required by the federal conspiracy offense.
The majority corrected the ICA’s reasoning and affirmed the ICA’s judgment, upholding the circuit court’s denial of Taylor’s motion to dismiss.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did the grand jury have probable cause that the Kanupa Cave artifacts were the property of another?	State argued ownership need not be named; any possession by another suffices.	Taylor argued no current possessory or property-interest holder was shown; NAGPRA ownership issues were not presented to the grand jury.	Probable cause existed to find artifacts were property of another, though the ICA statement was overbroad.
Does Hawaii’s HRS § 701-112 bar the state’s theft prosecution after a federal conviction?	State asserted that theft required different facts (value > $20,000) not required by the federal conspiracy offense.	Conspiracy and theft offenses may share underlying conduct; they are not sufficiently distinct.	Not barred; theft requires facts not required by the federal offense, so § 701-112(1)(a) does not preclude the state prosecution.

Ganal v. State, 81 Haw. 358 (Haw. 1996) (probable-cause standard for grand jury sufficiency; indictment need not prove conviction)
Ontai v. State, 84 Haw. 56 (Haw. 1996) (grand-jury sufficiency; evidence must support probable cause to indict)
Duncan v. State, 101 Haw. 269 (Haw. 2003) (three elements of theft in the first degree; value over $20,000 is an attendant element)
Nases, 65 Haw. 217 (Haw. 1982) (holding that naming the owner is surplusage when proving obtainment of the property of another)
Wong v. State, 97 Haw. 512 (Haw. 2002) (misleading grand-jury testimony requires dismissal for fairness; due-process concerns)
Scotland v. State, 58 Haw. 474 (Haw. 1977) (limited evidence can sustain indictment despite prejudicial evidence; remaining legal evidence may suffice)
Feola, 421 U.S. 671 (U.S. Supreme Court 1975) (conspiracy as a separate, inchoate offense; independent legitimate concerns)
Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997) (NAGPRA aims to repatriate; sentencing considerations differ from antiquities laws)