State v. Taylor, 402 P.3d 790

Police received a confidential-informant tip that Roy D. Taylor would be transporting methamphetamine; Officer Paul Scott later observed a car matching that description driving toward Heber City.
Scott followed Taylor and stopped him for allegedly following too closely; Scott later admitted the stop was pretextual to investigate the CI’s tip.
While Scott checked Taylor’s license and registration (about 3–5 minutes), two other officers arrived; one asked Taylor for consent to search the vehicle, and Taylor consented.
The search uncovered a glass pipe with residue, baggies, and a digital scale; officers later found methamphetamine hidden in the police car.
Taylor was charged with possession with intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia, moved to suppress the evidence arguing the stop and extended detention were unlawful, and was convicted after the trial court denied suppression.
On appeal Taylor argued (1) the stop was fabricated/pretextual and therefore unlawful, (2) police questioning/consent request exceeded the stop’s scope, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective during suppression proceedings. The court affirmed.

Issue	Taylor's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Legality of the traffic stop	Stop was fabricated; Officer Scott lied about following-too-close violation (pretext)	Pretext stops are lawful if an objective legal basis for the stop existed	Court upheld stop; credited officer’s testimony that Taylor followed too closely
Whether consent request/ questioning exceeded scope of stop	Officer delayed citation to allow narcotics officer to obtain consent, prolonging detention unlawfully	Questions and consent request occurred during the records check and did not measurably extend the stop	Court held detention was not unreasonably prolonged and consent was given before stop concluded
Effect of officer’s subjective intent (Lopez sliding-scale credibility)	Officer’s admission of pretext undermines credibility of traffic-violation testimony	Trial court properly found officer credible despite pretext admission; appellate courts defer to trial court credibility findings	Court declined to reweigh credibility; Lopez’s sliding scale does not override trial-court deference
Ineffective assistance of counsel re: suppression hearing	Counsel failed to pursue lines of questioning and failed to reply to State’s supplemental brief, prejudicing suppression argument	Counsel reasonably declined further briefing because law on pretext stops was settled; no prejudice shown	Court rejected ineffective-assistance claim: no deficient performance shown that caused prejudice

Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (examining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment)
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (two-step test for stop: justified at inception and reasonably related in scope)
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (traffic stop becomes unlawful if prolonged beyond time needed to handle the traffic matter)
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (officer inquiries unrelated to traffic stop lawful so long as they do not measurably extend detention)
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (shift from traffic stop to drug investigation permissible if detention duration is not extended)
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (ordinary questioning during lawful detention does not create separate Fourth Amendment event)
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (officers may ask questions and request consent even without individualized suspicion)
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah: officer’s subjective intent can bear on credibility; pretext stops lawful if objectively justified)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (to show prejudice from counsel’s deficient Fourth Amendment litigation, the underlying Fourth Amendment claim must be meritorious)
State v. Fuller, 332 P.3d 937 (standard of review for suppression rulings)