183 Conn. App. 354
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- Defendant Kerlyn M. Taveras was on probation (three years) after pleading guilty to prior threatening and assault charges; a probation condition prohibited committing criminal laws.
- March 11, 2014: at a Head Start preschool the defendant arrived ~40 minutes late, argued with staff in the lobby, was asked to leave, walked through an inner locked door, and after a staff comment allegedly said, “you better be careful, you better watch yourself” (police affidavit recites “you better watch your back”), attempted to reenter the locked doors, then left.
- Preschool staff reported being shaken; the director called police; defendant was arrested for breach of the peace (second degree).
- At the probation revocation hearing the state relied on testimony of the probation officer and the preschool director (hearsay recounting staff statements); the actual staff witness who observed the incident did not testify.
- Trial court found, by a preponderance, that defendant violated probation for breach of the peace based on his “threatening nature and demeanor” and revoked probation, sentencing him to 18 months.
- Appellate court reversed: it held the record insufficient to show the speech constituted either fighting words or a true threat, and the court could not sustain the revocation based solely on the ambiguous statements and limited evidence of threatening conduct.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Taveras's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence supported probation revocation for breach of the peace (speech or conduct) | Conduct + speech amounted to threatening behavior; court could infer aggressive reentry attempt and threatening demeanor | Only ambiguous, conditional speech; no proven violent/nonverbal conduct to satisfy §53a-181 | Reversed — insufficient evidence to find breach based on nonverbal conduct; court relied on words not proven conduct |
| Whether words were "fighting words" under §53a-181(a)(1) | Statement had a tendency to provoke imminent retaliation in addressee given the interaction | Words were ambiguous, conditional, non‑explicit, and defendant lacked immediacy/capability to carry out violence | Not fighting words — insufficient to provoke imminent violence; protected speech |
| Whether words were a "true threat" under §53a-181(a)(3) | Whole context made phrase a serious expression of intent to harm | Statement was susceptible to innocent or conditional readings; state failed to show addressee would highly likely interpret it as a genuine threat; no evidence addressee knew of defendant’s past violence | Not a true threat — ambiguity not removed by record; insufficient evidence |
| Whether revocation could rest on hearsay and prior convictions | State relied on director’s hearsay of staff report and defendant’s record to contextualize danger | Defendant argued evidence was unreliable, uncorroborated hearsay and insufficient to show probation violation | Court did not base reversal on hearsay rule alone; primary finding: even accepting testimony, speech was protected and insufficient to meet statutory elements |
Key Cases Cited
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (establishes "fighting words" exception to First Amendment)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (discusses true threats and limits of protected speech)
- State v. Krijger, 313 Conn. 434 (2014) (true-threat/fighting-words analysis; appellate independent review in First Amendment contexts)
- State v. DeLoreto, 265 Conn. 145 (2003) (interprets threatening language under §53a-181 and relationship between fighting words and true threats)
- State v. Parnoff, 160 Conn. App. 270 (2015) (fighting-words analysis; contextual inquiry into likelihood of violent retaliation)
- State v. Lo Sacco, 12 Conn. App. 481 (1987) (construction of "threatening" in public disturbance/breach statutes)
- State v. Baccala, 326 Conn. 232 (2017) (discusses contextual factors in assessing unprotected speech and when conduct+speech may be criminal)