State v. Sutton
73 N.E.3d 981
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- Michael Sutton was convicted in 2006 of attempted murder, felonious assault, inducing panic, failure to comply, and resisting arrest arising from a drive-by shooting; he received a lengthy prison sentence and his convictions/sentences were previously appealed and affirmed/remanded in part.
- In 2015 Sutton filed a motion for leave to file a delayed Crim.R. 33 motion for a new trial, supported by postconviction statements from four purported witnesses (three women who rode in the convoy and former Officer Greg Jones) and a written statement from Tyrell Bonner.
- The three women (Colvin, Redding, Corothers) stated they were in cars behind Sutton’s vehicle the night of the incident and that the lead gold car (identified as involving “Willie Wayne”) — not Sutton’s Lincoln — was responsible for shots; one woman acknowledged posttrial contact from defense appellate counsel.
- Former Officer Greg Jones told a 2015 investigator that the police report and Officer Lentz’s trial testimony did not accurately reflect what Jones recalled; Jones had been contacted in 2013 but no statement was taken then.
- The trial court summarily denied leave to file a delayed new-trial motion; Sutton appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion by denying leave and by not holding a hearing or making findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Sutton) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sutton was unavoidably prevented from discovering allegedly exculpatory witnesses so as to justify leave to file a delayed Crim.R. 33 motion | The record shows Sutton and his codefendants knew or could have discovered the three female witnesses and Jones’ relevant statements earlier; Sutton gave no adequate explanation for delay | The new statements are newly discovered/exculpatory (including potential Brady material) and Sutton was prevented from timely obtaining them while incarcerated | Court: No abuse of discretion; Sutton failed to show he was unavoidably prevented or timely in filing; leave denied |
| Whether the putative evidence (statements) is sufficiently probative to warrant a new-trial motion | Evidence either was not newly discovered (women were known), was not timely explained (Jones’ delay unexplained), or would not likely change the outcome (Bonner) | Evidence would undermine the prosecution’s theory and is material to guilt; a hearing was required to test materiality | Court: Evidence on its face did not meet threshold; no hearing required; denial affirmed |
| Whether the trial court erred by denying leave without an evidentiary hearing or written findings | The court properly exercised discretion; hearing not required where movant fails to meet clear-and-convincing threshold; no duty to issue findings when denying new-trial motions | Denial without a hearing or factual findings is an abuse of discretion; hearing required to assess Brady/newly discovered materiality | Court: No duty to issue findings; hearing discretionary and not required here; denial not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (abuse of discretion standard defined)
- State v. Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d 141 (1984) (defining "unavoidably prevented" in delayed new-trial context)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution's suppression of favorable, material evidence violates due process)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence: reasonable probability to undermine confidence in outcome)
- State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48 (1988) (Ohio adoption of Bagley materiality standard)
- State v. McConnell, 170 Ohio App.3d 800 (2007) (trial court discretion on evidentiary hearings for delayed new-trial requests)
- State v. Girts, 121 Ohio App.3d 539 (1997) (no duty to make findings when denying new-trial motions)