795 N.W.2d 456
Wis. Ct. App.2010Background
- Sugden, a judgment debtor under Wis. Stat. ch. 980, was committed as a sexually violent person after a 2007 jury verdict.
- At trial, experts Hill (pro-commitment) and Rosell/Pierquet (defense) offered conflicting diagnoses and risk assessments.
- Sugden moved for a new trial asserting newly discovered Static-99 risk percentages would affect the outcome.
- The circuit court denied the new-trial request and the State sought to exclude a parole-supervision sentence from Pierquet's report under the rule of completeness.
- The court and the court of appeals ultimately affirmed the judgment and declined discretionary reversal, concluding the inadmissible evidence did not prevent the real controversy from being tried.
- The decision analyzed categories of challenged testimony (postcommitment annual reviews, postcommitment treatment, and screening process) to determine their impact on the real controversy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the new Static-99 risk data require a new trial? | Sugden argues the new percentages create doubt about commitment. | State contends the new data would not alter Hill/Pierquet's opinions. | No reasonable probability of doubt; no new trial warranted. |
| Was the parole-supervision sentence properly excluded under the rule of completeness? | Sugden asserts the sentence should have been admitted to completeDr. Pierquet's report. | State contends supervision details are irrelevant to the § 980.01(7) issue and are misleading if admitted. | Yes, correctly excluded; not required to complete the record. |
| Did the admissible/inadmissible testimony require reversal because the real controversy was not fully tried? | Sugden invokes discretionary reversal due to improper testimony on postcommitment matters. | State argues the testified topics were either invited error or not controlling. | No reversal; inadmissible testimony did not prevent full resolution of core issues. |
| Were postcommitment annual reviews and postcommitment treatment properly analyzed for relevance to the core issues? | Sugden asserts these topics improperly influenced the jury. | State contends some references were invited or informational but not outcome-determinative. | Generally irrelevant; exceptions discussed but not outcome-dispositive. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. McCallum, 208 Wis. 2d 463 (1997) (new-trial standard for newly discovered evidence)
- State v. Plude, 310 Wis. 2d 28 (2008) (reasonable-probability standard for new-trial consideration)
- Vollmer v. Lusty, 156 Wis. 2d 1 (1990) (discretionary reversal power in interest-of-justice cases)
- State v. Hicks, 202 Wis. 2d 150 (1996) (real controversy-not-tried standard; non-preservation context)
- State v. Budd, 306 Wis. 2d 167 (2007) (role of screening-process testimony; relevance and potential prejudice)
- State v. Kaminski, 322 Wis. 2d 653 (2009) (postcommitment evidence; real-contest not fully tried analysis)
- State v. Treat v. Puckett, 252 Wis. 2d 404 (2002) (tethered to discretionary review scope in exceptional cases)
- Mark v. State, 292 Wis. 2d 1 (2006) (limitations of time-bound risk instruments)
