2019 Ohio 4650
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Appellant Max S. Struble was indicted for illegal assembly/possession of chemicals to manufacture drugs (R.C. 2925.041(A)), aggravated drug possession, and possessing criminal tools; convicted after a second jury trial and sentenced to an aggregate 18 months on the illegal-assembly count (part of a longer aggregate sentence on related counts).
- Officers observed Struble and companions make purchases at Target and Lowe’s: Struble bought two boxes of pseudoephedrine (Sudafed); a companion bought drain cleaner; officers later stopped the vehicle and found methamphetamine on Struble and others and drug paraphernalia in his pockets.
- The state introduced an Appriss Inc. National Precursor Log Exchange report (custodian Krista McCormack) showing 18 pseudoephedrine purchases by Struble over 32 months and one blocked purchase; trial court admitted the report under Evid.R. 404(B) to show intent.
- Narcotics sergeant Kemp testified that Struble’s purchase pattern and conduct (large quantity, furtive behavior, tamping pills into packaging, near-simultaneous drain-cleaner purchase) were consistent with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.
- Struble argued the prior-purchase report was inadmissible character evidence or unduly prejudicial (Evid.R. 404(B) and 403), that the state failed to prove specific intent to manufacture (sufficiency/manifest weight), and that R.C. 2925.041(A) is unconstitutionally vague/overbroad.
- The Eleventh District affirmed: the report’s admission was proper; the evidence sufficed to support intent; and the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior pseudoephedrine-purchase report (Evid.R.404(B)) | Prior purchases are relevant to intent to manufacture and admissible for that non-character purpose | Prior purchases were lawful and not probative of intent; inadmissible as 404(B) "other acts" evidence | Admissible: prior purchases relevant to intent; Kemp’s testimony provided proper context; no abuse of discretion |
| Undue prejudice (Evid.R.403) | Probative value of purchase history outweighs any prejudice; expert explained the pattern | Prior purchases were legal and their admission unfairly prejudiced the jury | Not unfairly prejudicial: trial court did not abuse discretion; expert testimony limited risk of misinterpretation |
| Sufficiency / manifest weight of evidence of intent to manufacture | Circumstantial evidence (furtive Sudafed purchase, drain cleaner purchase, pill repackaging, meth found on person, prior-purchase pattern) permit inference of intent | No direct evidence of manufacturing; lawful purchases and no proof Struble began manufacturing | Affirmed: reasonable juror could infer specific intent from circumstantial evidence; conviction not against manifest weight or insufficient |
| Vagueness / overbreadth of R.C. 2925.041(A) | Statute requires possession/assembly plus specific intent to manufacture, giving fair notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement | Statute is vague/overbroad because it criminalizes possession of otherwise lawful items based on intent | Statute upheld: intent element supplies constitutionally sufficient notice; not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Williams, 983 N.E.2d 1278 (Ohio 2012) (framework for admitting other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) and balancing under Evid.R. 403)
- State v. McDonald, 509 N.E.2d 57 (Ohio 1987) (possession statutes requiring specific intent avoid vagueness challenges)
- State v. Thompkins, 678 N.E.2d 541 (Ohio 1997) (explains manifest-weight standard; appellate court as "thirteenth juror")
- Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (U.S. 1999) (void-for-vagueness principles referenced for statutory clarity)
- Xenia v. Schmidt, 130 N.E. 24 (Ohio 1920) (strong presumption of constitutionality for legislative enactments)