State v. Strobel, 932 N.W.2d 303

Defendant Donald Strobel was convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled substance (2016) and sentenced using a criminal-history score of five, which included one-half of a felony point for a 2012 fifth-degree possession conviction.
In 2012 Strobel’s prior conviction was under Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2012); the statutory maximum then was 5 years and the district court imposed a stayed 15‑month sentence and probation.
The 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act (DSRA) amended some fifth‑degree possession offenses to be gross misdemeanors depending on amount/type of drug; those changes became effective August 1, 2016.
Strobel argued on appeal the Guidelines require using the element‑based offense definitions in effect at the time of the current offense (post‑DSRA) to classify prior offenses, so his 2012 conviction could be a gross misdemeanor and not warrant the half felony point.
The court of appeals agreed, remanding for resentencing and permitting the State to develop the record about the amount/type of drug involved in the 2012 conviction. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.B.7.a uses element‑based offense definitions (i.e., the statute defining the offense) in effect when the current offense was committed to classify prior offenses for criminal-history scoring.

Issue	Strobel's Argument	State's Argument	Held
How to determine whether a prior offense counts as a felony/gross misdemeanor under Minn. Sent. Guidelines § 2.B.7.a	"Offense definitions" means the element‑based statutory definition of the offense in effect when the current crime was committed (apply DSRA‑revised elements)	"Offense definitions" refers to the categorical definitions in Minn. Stat. § 609.02 (sentence‑based classification); if a felony sentence could be imposed, it counts as a felony	Court held "offense definitions" means element‑based definitions in the statute defining the offense, measured as of the time of the current offense (Strobel)

State v. Scovel, 916 N.W.2d 550 (Minn. 2018) (discusses meaning of "current" in § 2.B.7.a and DSRA context)
State v. Washington, 908 N.W.2d 601 (Minn. 2018) (Guidelines interpretation is reviewed de novo)
State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. 2017) (read Guidelines as a whole)
State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2012) (presumption that plain language manifests Commission intent)
State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. 2007) (criminal-history score review cannot be forfeited)
State v. Outlaw, 748 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. App. 2008) (remand to develop record about prior conviction classification)
State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 2017) (use dictionary definitions when Guidelines terms undefined)
State v. Spence, 768 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. 2009) (avoid interpretations that render provisions superfluous)
Dereje v. State, 837 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. 2013) (different words in same context are presumed to have different meanings)
Clark v. Pawlenty, 755 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 2008) (interpret same word consistently within a provision)
Akers v. Akers, 46 N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1951) (same‑word interpretation principle)