State v. Stone
2021 Ohio 2308
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2021Background
- On June 30, 2018, Richard Hamel was stabbed to death in the backyard of a house in Cleveland; medical examiner found 30 sharp‑force wounds and ruled the death a homicide.
- Jacob J. Stone and three codefendants (Day, Cole, Wolfe) were indicted on aggravated murder and related charges; Stone waived a jury trial and proceeded to a bench trial.
- Evidence showed a chain of planning involving a purported Hells Angels associate (Stewart), meetings in Mansfield, transport of Hamel to Cleveland under a pretext, and conversations about “dealing with” or killing Hamel; Stone gave a recorded statement corroborating many events but denied stabbing Hamel.
- After the killing Stone fled west with co‑defendants; surveillance and other investigation led to arrests and interviews. Day and Cole later pleaded guilty to aggravated murder; Wolfe pleaded to lesser charges.
- The trial court convicted Stone of two counts of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping (merged except kidnapping), and felonious assault; sentenced him to life with parole eligibility after 30 years on aggravated murder and concurrent 10 years on kidnapping.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Stone's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of April Hamel’s testimony about motorcycle‑club symbols (lay opinion) | Testimony was lay opinion based on personal experience and perception; relevant to context | Testimony constituted specialized, prejudicial gang‑opinion evidence beyond lay scope | Court allowed testimony; even if erroneous, any error was harmless given corroborating evidence |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to exclude trace‑metal detection testimony (Mabel) | Testimony had some relevance to investigation and was admissible; counsel performance not shown prejudicial | Counsel should have moved to exclude irrelevant, prejudicial testimony under Evid.R. 401/402 | Court found no Strickland prejudice; claim fails (no showing outcome would differ) |
| Manifest‑weight challenge to convictions | Evidence (including Stone’s statement, witness testimony, flight, post‑offense conduct) supports finding of intent and participation | Convictions rest on unreliable co‑defendant Day; Stone did not stab Hamel and lacked intent for murder | Court deferred to trier of fact; convictions not against manifest weight of the evidence |
| Sufficiency of evidence to convict (reliance on co‑conspirator testimony) | Day’s testimony was corroborated by other evidence and Stone’s own statements; sufficiency satisfied beyond reasonable doubt | Day’s testimony alone cannot convict under R.C. 2923.01(H)(1); insufficient proof of Stone’s intent and role | Court held evidence sufficient when viewed in state’s favor; R.C. 2923.01(H)(1) inapplicable because corroboration existed |
| Sentence challenge (life term for aggravated murder) | Sentence imposed under aggravated‑murder statute; appellate review limited by R.C. 2953.08(D) | Sentence harsher than co‑defendants and unsupported by clear and convincing evidence of factors | Court held sentence not reviewable on appeal for aggravated murder convictions; assignment overruled |
Key Cases Cited
- Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217 (1983) (abuse of discretion standard explained)
- Renfro v. Black, 52 Ohio St.3d 27 (1990) (appellate review of evidentiary rulings)
- Thompkins v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (manifest‑weight standard)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14 (2006) (application of Strickland in Ohio)
- State v. Coleman, 37 Ohio St.3d 286 (1988) (post‑offense flight and avoidance as inference of intent)
- State v. Porterfield, 106 Ohio St.3d 5 (2005) (statutory bar on appellate review of aggravated‑murder sentences)