State v. Stephenson
2015 NMCA 038
N.M. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Jennifer Stephenson put her 2-year-old son to bed in his locked bedroom, then slept in another room in the same apartment.
- During the night the child climbed onto a nearby dresser, which tipped and pinned his legs between the dresser and the bed rail.
- The child was not discovered until morning (around 7 a.m.); medical evidence indicated he had been trapped for hours and had pressure sores and compartment syndrome.
- Medical witnesses testified such injuries would take many hours to develop and that the child would have been crying and in extreme pain during that time.
- Defendant was acquitted of negligent child abuse (Section 30-6-1(D)(1)) but convicted by a jury of child abandonment (Section 30-6-1(B)); she appealed arguing insufficient evidence to support abandonment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether locking the child in his bedroom and ignoring his cries while remaining in the same apartment constituted "leaving or abandoning" under § 30-6-1(B) | The State argued the core issue was Defendant’s failure to act — leaving the child confined and trapped for 6–12 hours — and thus abandonment/neglect occurred | Stephenson argued her conduct was not "leaving" or "abandoning" because she remained in the same apartment and there was no intent to permanently depart | Reversed: under the statute and dictionary/precedent meaning, abandonment requires leaving the child with intent not to return; no evidence of such intent here, so conviction unsupported |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Chavez, 146 N.M. 434, 211 P.3d 891 (N.M. 2009) (discusses statutory construction and the spectrum of civil/criminal child-protection remedies)
- State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1994) (use plain statutory language to effectuate legislative intent)
- State v. Boyse, 303 P.3d 830 (N.M. 2013) (courts may consult dictionary meanings when interpreting statutory terms)
- State v. Bybee, 109 N.M. 44, 781 P.2d 316 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (criminal statutes must be read plainly; not applied unless legislative proscription is clear)
- United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 (U.S. 1932) (cited for principle limiting criminal statutes to clear legislative proscription)
- Commonwealth v. Skufca, 321 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1974) (recognizes some statutes may reach single episodes of severe parental neglect)
- Fernandez v. State, 269 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. App. 2008) (Texas statute interpreted to include temporary absences that leave a child without necessary care)