delivered- the opinion of the Court.
The appellee was indicted under § 1114 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 1 the charge being attempts to evade taxes for 1926 and 1927 by falsely understating taxable income. In bar of the action he pleaded that the face of the indictment showed the offenses were committed more than three years prior to the return of a true bill. The plea was sustained and the indictment quashed, on the ground that the period of limitations is fixed by the first clause of § 1110 (a) of the Act, 2 and not, as the appellant contended, in the proviso thereof. The basis of this ruling was -that the offense defined by use of the words “ evade or defeat ” does not involve defrauding or attempting to defraud within the intent of the proviso.
The appellant contends fraud is implicit in the concept of evading or defeating; and asserts that attempts to obstruct or defeat the lawful functions of any department of the Government
(Haas
v.
Henkel,
We are required to ascertain the intent of Congress from the language used and to determine what cases the proviso intended to except from the general statute of limitations applicable to all offenses against the internal revenue laws. Section 1114 (a) makes wilful failure to pay taxes, to make return, to keep necessary records, or to supply requisite information, a misdemeanor; and § 1114 (c) provides that wilfully aiding, assisting, procuring, counselling, or advising preparation or presentation- of a false or fraudulent return, affidavit, claim, or document shall be a felony. Save for that under consideration these are the only sections in the Revenue Act of 1926 defining offenses against the income tax law. There are, however, numerous statutes expressly making intent to defraud an element of'a specified offense against the revenue laws.
3
Under these, an indictment failing to aver that intent would be-defective; but under § 1114 (b) such an averment would be surplusage, for it would be sufficient to plead and prove a wilful attempt to evade or defeat. Compare
United States
v. Noveck,
As said in the
Noveck
case; statutes will not be read as creating crimes or classes of crimes unless’ clearly so intended, and obviously we are here concerned with one meant only to fix periods of limitation. Moreover, the concluding clause of the section, though denominated a proviso, is an excepting clause and therefore to be nar
*522
rowly construed.
United States
v.
McElvain,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
U. S. Code, Supp. V, Title 26, § 1266. “Any . . . person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade' or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall ... be guilty of a felony. . . .”
U. S. Code, Supp. Y, Title 18, § 585. “ No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any of the various offenses arising under the internal revenue laws of the United States unless the indictment is found or the information instituted within three years next after the commission of the offense: Provided, That for offenses involving the defrauding or attempting to defraud the United States or any agency thereof, whether by conspiracy or not, and in any manner, the period of limitation shall be six years. . .
See U. S. Code, Tit. 26, §§ 261, 306, 316, 555, 667, 775, 843, 1180, 1181, 1184, 1186.
