State v. Stephanie Berard, 220 A.3d 759

On July 14, 2016, Trooper Wayne Godfrey stopped Stephanie Berard after observing multiple traffic violations; Berard pulled into a parking lot, opened her door, and began to exit before being told to remain in the car.
Trooper Godfrey repeatedly (about 22 times over ~6 minutes) asked Berard to produce her driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance; Berard refused, demanded another officer be called (saying she recognized Godfrey from a prior encounter), and was combative and loud.
When a second officer arrived, Berard produced the documents; Godfrey forcibly removed her from the vehicle and arrested her for hindering a law enforcement officer under 13 V.S.A. § 3001(a).
A jury convicted Berard; the trial court denied her Rule 29(c) motion for judgment of acquittal and imposed a $400 fine (noting the felony conviction itself was significant); Berard appealed.
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and vacated the conviction, holding that an intentional civil violation of the motor-vehicle statutes (failure to produce required documents), by itself, may not support a § 3001 felony conviction and construing § 3001 narrowly to avoid vagueness and disproportionate application.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether refusal to produce license/registration/insurance alone can be the "action" that violates § 3001	Refusal was unlawful (no right to refuse) and therefore qualifies as an unlawful act under § 3001	Failure to produce is a civil motor-vehicle violation, not a criminal hindering act	No — an intentional civil motor-vehicle violation alone cannot, without more, sustain a § 3001 felony conviction
Whether Berard's conduct actually hindered the officer's lawful duties	Repeated refusals, combative behavior, and a multi-minute delay impeded the trooper’s investigation	The delay was essentially a traffic-code violation and did not substantially interfere with officer duties	Court declined to uphold conviction on that basis after concluding refusal-alone is insufficient; conviction reversed
Whether applying § 3001 to routine motor-vehicle violations renders the statute unconstitutionally vague	Statute covers hindering conduct; no vagueness shown	Broad application would allow arbitrary enforcement and fail to give fair notice	Court construed § 3001 narrowly (to exclude sole reliance on civil MV violations) to avoid void-for-vagueness concerns
Sufficiency of evidence / whether Rule 29 acquittal should have been granted	Evidence (video, testimony) fairly supports jury finding of hindering	State failed to prove the required impeding element beyond a reasonable doubt	Judgment of acquittal should have been entered; conviction vacated

State v. Harris, 152 Vt. 507, 568 A.2d 360 (Vt. 1989) (defines "hinders" and warns a broad reading risks vagueness)
State v. Stone, 170 Vt. 496, 756 A.2d 785 (Vt. 2000) (defines hindering as delaying/impeding officer progress)
State v. Neisner, 189 Vt. 160, 16 A.3d 597 (Vt. 2010) (articulates that impeding charge requires an unlawful act that actually hinders)
State v. Buck, 139 Vt. 310, 428 A.2d 1090 (Vt. 1981) (establishes test whether defendant had legal right to take action that impeded officer)
State v. Oren, 162 Vt. 331, 647 A.2d 1009 (Vt. 1994) (upheld conviction where conduct substantially prevented officer from leaving scene)
State v. Dion, 154 Vt. 420, 578 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1990) (upheld conviction for interfering with officer's arrest)
State v. Cantrell, 151 Vt. 130, 558 A.2d 639 (Vt. 1989) (discusses void-for-vagueness principle in criminal statutes)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (void-for-vagueness doctrine requires minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement)