State v. Steed
357 P.3d 547
Utah2015Background
- The State obtained an order under Utah's Asset Preservation Statute freezing $3,118,997.09 in Frank and Joan Steed’s personal and business accounts to secure anticipated restitution in a criminal tax case.
- A temporary restraining order was entered Oct. 14, 2008; criminal tax charges followed Oct. 15, 2008; the freeze continued as a preliminary injunction and was later upheld after a de novo hearing.
- The Steeds were convicted; the Tax Commission calculated tax liability of $247,802 and the district court applied $553,446 of the frozen funds to tax obligations, penalties, interest, and fines, returning the remainder.
- The Steeds challenged the Asset Preservation Statute facially and as-applied under takings and due process theories and argued the State failed to meet its statutory burden; the district court denied relief and entered final judgment.
- On appeal, Steed conceded her claims were technically moot; the threshold question became whether the court’s mootness exception (capable/likely to evade review) applied. The majority concluded the exception did not apply and dismissed the case.
- The court clarified its third mootness-prong language: the proper standard is "likely to evade review," not the broader "capable of evading review." The majority held freeze orders are not inherently short in duration and thus do not meet that prong.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Justiciability / mootness exception applicability | Steed: freeze orders likely evade review because defendants prioritize criminal defense and lack resources to litigate the civil freeze, so the exception should apply | State: freeze orders can persist and be challenged; defendants have procedural routes and sometimes resources to obtain review | Held: Moot; exception does not apply—third prong (likely to evade review) not satisfied because freeze orders are not inherently short in duration |
| Proper formulation of third prong of mootness exception | Steed: relied on precedent allowing exception when issues may be mooted by litigant choices (McBride) | State: Court should focus on whether issue itself is inherently short-lived, not on likely litigant choices | Held: Court adopts narrower formulation—must be "likely to evade review," disavows broader "capable of evading review" language |
| Relief on merits (facial/as-applied takings and due process) | Steed: statute permits pre-charge deprivation and the State froze more funds than necessary, violating takings and due process | State: statutory procedure lawful and provided adequate protections; factual sufficiency of freeze supported | Held: Not reached—court dismissed on mootness grounds |
| Precedent (McBride) application | Steed: McBride supports applying the mootness exception when litigant choices may moot a claim | State: McBride should not expand exception beyond traditional limits | Held: Court declines to overrule McBride but limits its application; concurrence urges overruling McBride but court leaves it intact |
Key Cases Cited
- H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 203 P.3d 943 (Utah 2009) (mootness principle and definition)
- Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 289 P.3d 582 (Utah 2012) (discussion of mootness exception and judicial power limits)
- Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713 (Utah 1977) (dismissal obligation when no justiciable controversy)
- McBride v. Utah State Bar, 242 P.3d 769 (Utah 2010) (applied an "alternative" mootness analysis based on litigant choices; court debated but did not overrule)
- In re Adoption of L.O., 282 P.3d 977 (Utah 2012) (example of inherently short-duration issues and mootness)
- State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) (stare decisis and burden for overruling precedent)
- State v. Baker, 229 P.3d 650 (Utah 2010) (caution against overruling precedent without adversarial briefing)