State v. Stanley, 404 P.3d 1100

Police responded to a 9-1-1 call from the victim (defendant’s then‑girlfriend) reporting a domestic disturbance: she had been attacked, the defendant had briefly taken her phone, the bathroom door had been broken, and there was a gun somewhere in the house. Dispatch said the victim was upstairs and felt safe there; defendant was on the front porch when officers arrived.
Officers Burnum and Hill approached; defendant was calm. Hill told defendant, “I’m going to go in and check on [the victim].” Defendant replied, “Go on ahead. She’s inside.” Officers did not recall asking for consent.
Hill and another officer entered the house; Burnum stayed outside interviewing defendant. Inside, officers observed the damaged bathroom door and the victim’s injuries and photographed them. Those photos and victim statements were used at trial.
Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the warrantless entry, arguing the entry was not permitted by the emergency aid exception and that he did not voluntarily consent. The trial court denied the motion, concluding the entry was allowable under community‑caretaking/emergency aid and that defendant’s reply amounted to consent.
After a bench trial defendant was convicted of harassment and interfering with making a report. On appeal the court reviewed whether the emergency aid or consent exceptions justified the warrantless entry and whether the admission of the disputed evidence was harmless error.

Issue	State's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the warrantless entry was justified under the emergency aid exception	Officers reasonably inferred a risk of serious harm from the reported attack, taken phone, damaged door, and gun; entry to render aid was justified	Officers lacked a subjective belief that the victim was seriously injured and in immediate need of assistance; entry was investigatory/speculative	Entry not justified: record shows officers did not subjectively believe immediate aid was required, so emergency aid exception does not apply
Whether defendant voluntarily consented to entry	Defendant’s statement “Go on ahead. She’s inside.” amounted to consent	The statement was mere acquiescence to an asserted inevitability and did not reflect voluntary choice	No voluntary consent: officer’s declarative “I’m going to go in” left no reasonable opportunity to refuse; defendant’s response was acquiescence
Whether evidence obtained after entry should be admitted	Evidence of door damage and victim injuries corroborated victim and was probative	Evidence was obtained from an unlawful entry and should be suppressed	Admission was erroneous and not harmless given credibility contest; conviction reversed and remanded
Whether to address sentencing fee challenge	State asked to affirm overall disposition	Defendant raised separate challenge to unitary assessment statute repeal	Court declined to reach sentencing fee issue as suppression error required reversal

State v. Ehly, 317 Or. 66 (standard of review for suppression hearings) (discusses reviewing factual findings and inferences)
State v. Baker, 350 Or. 641 (emergency aid exception requires objectively reasonable belief based on articulable facts)
State v. Hamilton, 285 Or. App. 315 (emergency aid exception requires subjective belief that immediate aid for serious injury is necessary)
State v. McCullough, 264 Or. App. 496 (speculative concern that someone may need aid is insufficient for emergency aid exception)
State v. Jepson, 254 Or. App. 290 (state’s burden to prove voluntary consent by preponderance; voluntariness test)
State v. Berg, 223 Or. App. 387 (mere acquiescence to police authority is not voluntary consent)
State v. Briggs, 257 Or. App. 738 (words used by officer matter; statements that do not leave a reasonable choice indicate acquiescence)
State v. Ry/Guinto, 211 Or. App. 298 (contrast: persistence may not vitiate consent where requests still convey choice)
State v. Freund, 102 Or. App. 647 (declaratory statements that make search appear inevitable amount to acquiescence)
State v. Davis, 336 Or. 19 (standard for harmless error review of evidentiary errors)