State v. Speedis, 256 P.3d 1061

The State charged Speedis with first-degree burglary, second-degree assault, and third-degree assault; jury trial followed notice of eight aggravating factors, four of which were tried to the jury.
Four nonenumerated aggravating factors (supervision status, deterrence failure, on release status with pending charges, disregard for laws) were found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court imposed upward departures based on each factor, yielding 72-month sentences for burglary and second-degree assault, concurrent, with third-degree assault merged.
Speedis argued that nonenumerated aggravating factors are unconstitutional under separation of powers and are vague under state/federal due process.
The Court of Appeals affirmed; this court granted review to resolve the recurring issue of lawfulness of nonenumerated aggravating factors.
The court ultimately held that using nonenumerated factors to depart within the guidelines is constitutional and not vague under state or federal law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Separation of powers and nonenumerated factors	Speedis argues nonenumerated factors infringe legislative authority.	State argues courts may rely on nonenumerated factors within guidelines.	Not unconstitutional; permissible within sentencing authority.
Vagueness under state constitution	Nonenumerated factors fail to provide ascertainable standards and fair notice.	Guidelines provide sufficient standards and limits on discretion.	Not vague under Article I, sections 20-21; standards exist.
Due process and notice to prosecutors	Nonenumerated factors give prosecutors unfettered discretion.	Appellate decisions recognizing specific factors guide notice and charging.	Procedural framework provides fair notice and limits prosecutorial discretion.
Role of guidelines vs. indeterminate sentencing	Presumptive sentence is the statutory maximum; departure authority is unclear.	Guidelines do not cap the judiciary; departures are permitted with justification.	Presumptive sentences are not outer statutory maximum; departures valid under Dilts framework.

State v. Dilts, 336 Or. 158 (2003) (explains state sentencing structure and presumptive vs. maximum within indeterminate scheme)
State v. Leathers, 271 Or. 236 (1975) (sentencing within statutory ranges; limits on judicial authority)
State v. Stewart/Billings, 321 Or. 1 (1995) (recognizes factors for determining sentence within range)
State v. Scott, 237 Or. 390 (1964) (offense seriousness and offender character as sentencing criteria)
State v. Upton, 339 Or. 673 (2005) (upholds use of factors to support departure if substantial and compelling)
State v. Graves, 299 Or. 189 (1985) (fair notice concept in vagueness context before Delgado/Illig-Renn shift)
Delgado v. Souders, 334 Or. 122 (2002) (fair notice not a state vagueness issue; focus on notice within context)
Illig-Renn, 341 Or. 228 (2006) (focus on discretion rather than fair notice for state vagueness claim)
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (due process requires notice; prior decisions can guide notice)