State v. Spaniol, 895 N.W.2d 329

In October 2014, 4-year-old A.S. was diagnosed with gonorrhea; Child Protective Services and police investigated possible sexual abuse.
Defendant Joshua Spaniol (father) attended police interviews on Oct. 9–10; he made incriminating admissions across three interview segments and was later arrested.
A.S., diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and communication delays, gave a recorded forensic interview and later testified at a competency hearing and at trial.
Pretrial, Spaniol moved to suppress his Oct. 10 statements and to exclude or challenge A.S.’s competency to testify; the court denied suppression and found A.S. competent.
At trial the jury heard A.S.’s Child’s Voice interview, A.S. testified (with some memory lapses), and Spaniol was convicted of three counts of first-degree rape and one count of sexual contact with a child.
Sentenced to consecutive prison terms, Spaniol appealed raising four issues: competency, confrontation/unavailability, suppression of statements, and jury Instruction 11 (definition of sexual penetration).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Spaniol)	Held
Competency of child witness to testify	A.S. had sufficient capacity to observe, recollect, communicate, and understand truth/lie	A.S.’s age, autism, one-word answers and contradictions made her incompetent	Court affirmed: no abuse of discretion in finding A.S. competent
Sixth Amendment — availability for cross-examination	A.S. appeared, answered, and was subject to thorough cross-exam allowing jury to assess credibility	A.S. became effectively unavailable during cross (memory lapses), denying effective confrontation	Court held Confrontation Clause not violated; A.S. was available and cross-examination was adequate
Suppression of defendant’s statements (Miranda & voluntariness)	Interviews were non-custodial until Miranda given; waiver before final segment was valid; statements voluntary	First two segments were custodial and Miranda should have been given earlier; statements coerced/overborne	Court affirmed denial of suppression: first two segments non-custodial, subsequent waiver valid, statements voluntary
Jury Instruction 11 — definition of "sexual penetration"	Instruction correctly states law and was supported by evidence (labial/vulval penetration suffices)	Instruction emphasized extra-jurisdictional rules and risked usurping jury factfinding	Court held instruction proper and not prejudicial; no abuse of discretion

State v. Carothers, 724 N.W.2d 610 (S.D. 2006) (standard for child competency: observe, recollect, communicate, some sense of moral responsibility)
State v. Anderson, 608 N.W.2d 644 (S.D. 2000) (child competency factors and court discretion)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause governs testimonial hearsay and trial confrontation)
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (effective opportunity for cross-examination satisfies Confrontation Clause)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (two-step interrogation and midstream Miranda warnings problematic)
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (post-warning statements may be admissible if earlier unwarned admissions were not coerced)
State v. Toohey, 816 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 2012) (child witness with imperfect memory still may be "available" for confrontation)
State v. Packed, 736 N.W.2d 851 (S.D. 2007) (slight vulval/labial penetration can constitute penetration for rape)
State v. Guthmiller, 667 N.W.2d 295 (S.D. 2003) (preference to allow child to testify so jury may assess credibility)