State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120

Ryan Smith had prior impaired-driving convictions (2001 DWI-related convictions and a 2005 gross-misdemeanor criminal vehicular operation (CVO) resulting in bodily harm).
In 2010 Smith was arrested for driving while impaired; the State charged first-degree DWI, which requires the offense occur within ten years of the first of three or more qualified prior impaired-driving incidents.
The prosecution relied on three prior incidents, including the 2005 CVO conviction, to enhance the 2010 DWI to first-degree; Smith objected that the 2005 CVO was not a listed qualifying offense.
The court of appeals upheld the first-degree convictions applying an absurdity rationale; the Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the 2005 CVO conviction qualified under Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 20 (2008).
The majority held the 2005 CVO statute (Minn. Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2b(6) (2004)) was not listed in the definitional statute and, under plain-language and expressio unius principles, did not qualify as a prior impaired-driving conviction; they reversed the first-degree convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Smith’s 2005 CVO conviction qualifies as a "prior impaired driving conviction" under Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 20 (2008) for purposes of first-degree DWI enhancement	Smith: The exact statutory citation under which he was convicted (§ 609.21, subd. 2b(6)) is not listed in § 169A.03, subd. 20 (2008), so it does not qualify	State: The conduct in Smith’s 2005 conviction is substantively the same as the offense now codified at § 609.21, subd. 1(6), so the prior conviction should qualify despite renumbering; excluding it produces an absurd result	Held: The 2005 CVO conviction is not a qualifying prior impaired-driving conviction under the plain text of § 169A.03, subd. 20 (2008); expressio unius and statutory specificity control, and the absurdity canon does not justify rewriting the statute.

Schwanke v. Minn. Dep’t of Admin., 851 N.W.2d 591 (Minn. 2014) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. 2011) (discussing expressio unius est exclusio alterius)
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (U.S. 2003) (omission in statutory list suggests deliberate exclusion)
Wegener v. Comm’r of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1998) (rare use of absurdity canon to override plain language where statute would otherwise yield unconstitutional result)
Leathers v. State, 799 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 2011) (statutory-interpretation principles)
State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 2013) (ambiguity standard: statute is ambiguous if subject to more than one reasonable interpretation)
State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. 2016) (read statute as a whole when assessing ambiguity)
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (U.S. 2008) (rule of lenity and resolving criminal-statute ambiguity in defendant’s favor)